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ABSTRACT
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NETWORK
TRAFFIC: DEVICE PROFILING AND
CLASSIFICATION
MAY 2019
MYTHILI VISHALINI ANBAZHAGAN
B.E., KUMARAGURU COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY
MSECE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor David Irwin
Time and again we have seen the Internet grow and evolve at an unprecedented
scale. The number of online users in 1995 was 40 million but in 2020, number of
online devices are predicted to reach 50 billion, which would be 7 times the human
population on earth. Up until now, the revolution was in the digital world. But
now, the revolution is happening in the physical world that we live in; IoT devices
are employed in all sorts of environments like domestic houses, hospitals, industrial
spaces, nuclear plants etc., Since they are employed in a lot of mission-critical or even
life-critical environments, their security and reliability are of paramount importance
because compromising them can lead to grave consequences.
IoT devices are, by nature, different from conventional Internet connected devices
like laptops, smart phones etc., They have small memory, limited storage, low pro-
cessing power etc., They also operate with little to no human intervention. Hence
it becomes very important to understand IoT devices better. How do they behave
iii
in a network? How different are they from traditional Internet connected devices?
Can they be identified from their network traffic? Is it possible for anyone to identify
them just by looking at the network data that leaks outside the network, without even
joining the network? That is the aim of this thesis. To the best of our knowledge,
no study has collected data from outside the network, without joining the network,
with the intention of finding out if IoT devices can be identified from this data. We
also identify parameters that classify IoT and non-IoT devices. Then we do manual
grouping of similar devices and then do the grouping automatically, using clustering
algorithms. This will help in grouping devices of similar nature and create a profile
for each kind of device.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Internet as we know it, keeps changing rapidly. When the Internet was first
brought to the general public, it only had computers connected to it through some
form of wired connection. Then came the next phase of the Internet with the advent
of WiFi. This led to the rapid increase in the number of mobile devices and laptops
that became connected to the Internet. As time progressed, the number of devices
connected to the Internet went from 500 million in 2003 to 12.5 billion in 2010, a
2400% increase [1]. Cisco believes that the IoT (Internet-of-Things) wave began in
this period, when the number of devices connected to the Internet exceeded the world
population. And it is predicted that the number of Internet-connected devices will
reach 50 billion by 2020.
Figure 1.1: The Beginning of the IoT Phase
The concept of IoT was conceived long ago in the late 90s [2]. But we see an
explosion in the number of IoT devices only now. Because, back then, we did not
have the technology to realize this concept cost-effectively. But today,
• manufacturing of electronic devices has become faster and cheaper
1
• more and more devices are getting wireless communication capability
• network access has become better with high speed broadband connections
• battery technology has become more efficient
• we are moving into IPv6 to allow a larger number of devices to join the Internet
Leveraging these technological improvements, things from all walks of life have
joined the realm of IoT; for instance, light bulbs, thermostats, door bells, windows in
houses, air purifiers and humidifiers, garage doors, refrigerators, dishwashers, washers
and dryers etc., in the domestic sector; Bluetooth beacons to track the location of
assets, tracking devices in oil and gas facilities to detect oil spills, sensors in cargo
shipments to track the condition of the environment like temperature, humidity, tilt,
pressure etc., in the industry sector; Fitbits for tracking heartbeat rate or number of
steps taken in a day, insulin pumps with sensors for monitored and controlled release
of Insulin and so many more devices in the medical sector.
Hence, an IoT device can be defined as, ”A device whose function focuses on
sensing and/or actuating on the environment around them”.
Up until now, the revolution was in the digital world. But now, the revolution is
happening in the physical world that we live in; IoT devices are employed in all sorts
of environment like domestic homes, hospitals, industrial sectors, nuclear plants etc.,
2
CHAPTER 2
MOTIVATION
In order to perform the functions they are intended to perform, IoT devices must
collect data about/from their environments; they collect data 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week. And they process that data (or more correctly, a remote server does the
processing for them) to derive meaningful insights about their environment and make
intelligent decisions. Further, IoT devices are designed in such a way that they
require little to no human intervention for performing their duties. As a result, if
they are compromised, it is very difficult for a consumer to realize that they have
been compromised. And IoT devices are typically endowed with very low system
resources, like low processing power, small memory and storage etc., Because of this,
their computation power is lower compared to traditional Internet connected devices
and it is difficult to implement the same security mechanisms that we do in devices
like laptops or smart phones. As a result of all the above factors combined, the privacy
and security risks posed by IoT devices are novel. And because they are employed
in a lot of mission critical and safety critical applications, their compromise can have
grave or even fatal consequences.
The huge amount of risks involved is the main motivation for this thesis. The lack
of understanding about the IoT devices lets us make uninformed decisions on buy-
ing and using the IoT devices. Hence, this thesis is aimed at understanding the IoT
devices better; that would be the first step in defining better security policies for han-
dling IoT devices and safeguarding ourselves from giving away sensitive information
in the name of data collection.
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2.1 Privacy Risks in IoT
In smart homes, IoT devices collect lots of information that could be used to dis-
cern information that were not intended by the occupants of the house. For example,
data from smart light bulbs, that use motion detectors to turn on the lights, could be
used to find out information about the current occupancy of the house. Or if the ISP
sees that medical IoT devices are connected to the Internet from a particular house,
they could sell that information to advertising agencies which can direct health care
advertisements towards the residents of that house. Revealing that they own a Blood
Pressure Monitor is, by itself, a breach on privacy; the ISP does not have to know
the exact readings on the Blood Pressure Monitor.
And the most alarming aspect of this data collection is that it is very difficult to
understand what is being collected, when it is collected etc., and to verify if a device
collects only the data it says it will collect.
For example in 2015, there was an issue in Chromium, which is the open source
web browser from Google. Some users noticed that, when they installed Chromium,
an extension namely ”Hotword” was downloaded and loaded automatically into the
browser. There was no way to either stop this extension from being downloaded or
disable it nor was it possible to view the source code to see what it was doing. Not
being able to view the source code is itself a violation of the Open Source Policy, which
Chromium has adopted. Google answered that it was to activate the microphone, so
that it could catch the keywords ”OK Google”, to prompt Google Assistant. This
could potentially mean that the microphone was ON the entire time and it was
recording everything that was happening around it, in order to detect the keywords
”OK Google.” Google went on to explain that being enabled does not mean that the
microphone was always turned ON, but only when the tab opens ”Google.com” or
when a New Tab with Google Search Engine is opened. But after severe revolt from
its users, that extension was removed from Chromium.
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Also there is the risk of Identification i.e., taking the data collected like location,
address etc., and associating that data with an individual. This could potentially lead
to profiling and tracking of that person, recording every move they make, recording
wherever they go, without their consent [3]. The increasing number of voice activated
devices are also adding to the privacy risks of identification and tracking. As every
person’s voice is so different, to the point of unique identification based on pitch, gaps
between words, how they pronounce the words etc., voice can be used effectively to
identify a person among crowd [4]. Many smart phones use Machine Learning to learn
and recognize their owner’s voice and do not respond to anybody else’s voice. With
surveillance cameras cropping up every where on the grounds of offering security, the
risk is ever increasing. It is possible to track all the places someone has been for an
entire day in any major city, where there are traffic cameras on almost all the streets.
Hence, with the growing number of IoT devices in every house, it is very difficult
for a consumer to understand what data is being collected about them and control
it. IoT devices often come with a manual that state the purpose of the device but
its content is seldom in simple, understandable words. And the manufacturers and
sellers of the IoT devices also rarely take the pain to remain transparent about the
exhaustive list of data that is being collected by their devices. With more and more
shops and cities opting to use these IoT devices for various purposes, the general
public’s chances of staying away from these device is also growing slim. Governments
have still not caught up on the recent trends and technologies and their regulations
are not very effective in preventing and curbing these privacy breaches.
2.2 Security Risks in IoT
IoT devices can be compared to babies with very weak immune systems in a world
of adults with stronger immune systems who can fight off infections much more easily
than the babies do. IoT devices, by design, are small systems and are meant for
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doing one or a very few closely related tasks. They also operate on battery power.
Hence their system resources are not as powerful as mainstream computers or smart
phones. Hence, by default, their software security mechanisms are weaker; at present,
they cannot fend for themselves as powerfully as other Internet-connected devices do.
Also, they do not have enough hardware resources to properly encrypt the data they
collect and then send them out; this encryption and other heavy lifting are mostly
done by IoT Gateways. Further, for most of these devices, their default passwords
are not changed at all after they are bought. This is a critical flaw, one that invites
hacking.
There has been a lot of security breaches and threats recently, after the influx
of large number of IoT devices into the Internet. Taking advantage of the above-
mentioned short comings, IoT devices have been victims of a lot of hacking attempts.
The best example is the October 2016 DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-Service) attacks
targeted towards Dyn, a major DNS service provider [5]. In a DoS attack, a huge
amount of traffic/requests is aimed towards servers so that they will either become
unavailable to legitimate requests while busily handling this traffic surge and not
completing any request or will be overwhelmed completely and shut down. It is ’dis-
tributed’ in the sense that the request comes from hosts distributed all over the Inter-
net. The attack on Dyn was launched using a botnet, a network created by infecting
devices with a malware (malicious software) and then controlling them without the
owner’s knowledge. This attack used a malware called Mirai, that infected devices
that had not changed their default passwords and took control of them. Further, these
infected devices started searching the Internet for more and more devices that were
using default passwords and took them over too. It brought down major websites
like Twitter, PayPal, Etsy, Verizon, Comcast etc., Not changing the factory-provided
default password is a huge security risk because the default passwords are often iden-
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tical for a single line of products from the same vendor. It is very easy to find them
online in product documentation or other sources [24].
Figure 2.1: Internet Outage Caused by DDoS Attack on Dyn - Oct 21, 2016
Another well known DDoS attack is the one on KrebsonSecurity. Though it was
unsuccessful, the scale of the attack was unprecedented [6]. The traffic targeted
towards their servers were close to 620 Gigabits per second. The security experts
from Akamai dealt with the attack and curbed it successfully after much effort, but
said that it was double the scale of the largest attack they had ever seen before that.
Infecting devices with malware and conducting DDoS attacks have happened before
too. And many times, DNS servers are the target; because they are mostly public
and accept requests from all addresses. Instead of targeting single servers, targeting
DNS servers and rendering them useless will affect countless servers and can even
bring down a part of the Internet. Before IoT devices, DNS Amplification attacks
were often used. In this attack, the requests are crafted in such a way that they will
elicit a very large response from the server. Hence, with a fewer number of requests,
it will be possible to bring down the DNS servers. Now, with the number of IoT
devices connected to the Internet approaching billions, even without amplification
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DNS attacks, it is still possible to flood DNS servers by utilizing the sheer number
of IoT devices. If these devices, already having strength in numbers, were to wage
amplification DNS attacks, the magnitude of that attack can bring down the entire
Internet one day.
DDoS attacks are just one of the security risks surrounding the IoT devices. There
are many more like Man-in-the-middle attacks, Sinkhole attacks, Sleep Deprivation
attacks etc., All are made easily possible by taking advantage of the flimsy security
patches on IoT devices.
IoT devices have also invaded the industrial space recently. This is said to be the
fourth industrial revolution [7] after mechanical, electrical and IT revolution. Security
breaches in the industrial sector can be even more grave and sometimes even fatal.
A mishap in a sensor that detects oil leaks could lead to very serious environmental
impacts and can cost millions of dollars to rectify it. Failing of or malware infection
in power grids could lead to major outages. In 2010, nuclear facilities in Iran were
damaged by Stuxnet, a malicious worm that specifically targeted Siemens SCADA
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems and infected the Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) [29]. This compromised the valves in the gas centrifuges
and as a result, pressure built up inside the centrifuges ultimately damaging them.
In 2015, security researchers Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek of Cruise Automation
demonstrated that they could hack into a 2014 Jeep Cherokee and take control of the
music player, air conditioning system and even cut down the transmission [8]. Hence,
compromising of Industrial IoT devices are serious issues that require more attention
and consideration.
As more and more devices enter the Internet each day, large in numbers and
varying in types, the privacy and security risks involved keep increasing. New methods
of hacking these devices crop up each day with the advancement in technologies and
tools. Therefore the first step in preventing these attacks and mitigating these risks
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is to understand the IoT devices better. That is the aim of this thesis. It is focused
on learning more about the behaviour of the IoT devices such as what type of data do
they collect? what kind of information can be discerned from the collected data? how
different are they from traditional Internet connected devices? do IoT devices behave
the same way in the network as other devices do? can IoT devices be identified just
from their network traffic? more importantly, is it possible to identify them just from
the network data that leaks outside, without even joining the network? If an intruder
is looking to compromise a network, he would be looking for the weakest link in the
network and that would be IoT devices. If can identify IoT devices just from their
network data that leaks outside, without even joining the network, then the network
is as good as compromised.
9
CHAPTER 3
RELATED WORK
IoT data analysis is a rapidly growing field of research today in both academy and
industry. IoT devices are relatively new to the world of computer networks; hence
more and more research is under taken everyday to better understand them. A cloud
based architecture for IoT devices is proposed in [9] for fulfilling the need of a scal-
able and secure IoT cloud network which would be essential for future projects like
smart cities. The research in [10] tries to bridge the gap between IoT data analysis
and machine learning by proposing a framework to increase the ease of development.
Another framework for IoT is proposed in [11] to improve edge computing by incor-
porating a controller in the fog. Many researches also focus on improving the security
in IoT networks. Authors from [12] review the state of security mechanisms in IoT
and the status of the research that is going on in this field regarding encryption al-
gorithms, communication security, protecting the sensor data etc., Finally they also
list the possible challenges in IoT in incorporating the security mechanisms. The
work in [13] tries to list out the environmental and security context and cross-device
interactions of the IoT devices through ”brute-force” and proposes using such models
for identifying potential attacks on the IoT devices in the network. Though many
such innovative attempts are undertaken more and more, research on analyzing the
nature of the IoT devices itself is very few. Few researches so far have attempted
to understand the IoT devices through their network traffic data. The work done in
[14] provides a list of various techniques that can be used for classifying the network
traffic using machine learning. It highlights the limitations of conventional packet
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inspection and classification purely based on port numbers and payload. The re-
search in [15] aims to detect malware in the network by using supervised learning
to analyze the network traffic and detect the presence of malware and trying to at-
tribute it to an already known group of malwares. This is in a way characterizing
the network traffic but does not use this approach to study IoT devices directly. The
work done in [16] also tries to detect malware by characterizing the network traffic
in a smart home environment. To evaluate their model, they conduct attacks on
real IoT devices and succeed in accessing an IoT device from outside the network.
Research done in [17] is more closely related to our research. It aims to identify the
IoT devices using their network characteristics and employing supervised learning to
further train and test their model. But the number of devices considered are very
few (around 13) and network characteristics considered are primarily TCP sessions.
Some publicly available data from Alexa and GeoIP were used to enrich their data.
Though it shows a high accuracy of results, the data set considered is very less. A
hybrid approach based on Convolutional and Recurrent neural networks to classify
the network traffic is proposed in [18] as an alternative method for classifying traffic
over using supervised or unsupervised learning. Authors from [17] also carried out
another work [19] where they aim to detect unauthorized IoT devices by using the
supervised machine learning algorithm Random Forest. But here also, the number
of IoT devices considered for the experiment is 17. The work done in [20] also aims
to characterize and profile IoT devices using network data. They have a test bed
comprised of 21 unique IoT devices and try to simulate a smart city environment.
More device characteristics like their Sleep/Active periods and the application layer
protocols of the devices are considered. And finally they use supervised learning to
identify devices. This research also shows high accuracy of results but the period
of the network data capture is 3 weeks, of which 2 weeks is used for analyzing and
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training and 1 week of data is used for testing. It is also carried out in a simulated
lab and data is captured only from inside the network.
As per the best of our knowledge, up until this point, a full scale real time analysis
of the IoT devices has not been carried out to learn the characteristics of the devices
itself. Large enterprises do employ IoT network data analytics but they are aimed at
assisting their business, helping them in decision making, in operations management
etc., Some academic researchers also have attempted to characterize the IoT devices
using their network traffic data but the experimentations carried out were often small
with a maximum of 20+ devices being employed. The devices were hand chosen and
were usually employed in a lab setup. Data was generally collected only from inside
the network. The duration of the data capture was also short, in the order of weeks.
No study has collected data for comparatively longer duration and from various points
in the network in a real-time setup to purely learn about the IoT devices. That is
what this research is trying to fulfill. It captures network data from 40+ IoT and
non-IoT devices in a real-time environment. The minimum period of capture in our
experiment is 3 months and the maximum is 6 months for analysis and testing. We
have captured data from both inside and outside the network to learn what can be
learned about the devices in the network just from their network traffic, observed
from both outside and inside the network. Also a lot of the recent researches that
have used machine learning for characterizing the network traffic have used supervised
learning. But we are aiming to apply clustering algorithms to group devices that are
innately similar in nature. The profiles thus obtained would help in identifying IoT
devices and non-IoT devices in the future and possibly go a step further and identify
the device itself.
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CHAPTER 4
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 Capturing the Network Data
The prerequisite for our analysis is the network data. The network data can be
defined as what is sent across the network between the nodes present in the network.
By collecting this data from various points and analyzing it, we can find out what
information can be learnt from it. To capture this network data, we used Tshark
[21], which is the command line version of the popular tool, Wireshark [22]. Tshark
is used for capturing, displaying and parsing the network data into human readable
format. The network data is sent across the network as binary data in the form
of packets and the captured data is stored with the extension ’.pcap’, which stands
for ’packet capture’. Cron jobs were used for ensuring the continuous running of
Tshark to capture packets without a break. Since the we are going to capture the
network packets at a remote location, the entire setup is implemented onto Raspberry
Pi devices and deployed at the target location. Since the Raspberry Pi has limited
storage, the collected data is moved periodically onto a remote server for storage.
4.2 Points of Traffic Observation
From the network’s point of view, the traffic can be observed from either inside the
network or outside the network. An intruder might not know the password to join the
network, but he might still observe the traffic from outside the network, capturing all
the packets that he can. Sometimes, an attacker might gain access into the network
and in that case, he can probably see almost everything that is going on inside the
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network. To understand what information can be learned just by passively observing
the network traffic without joining the network and what can be learned once access
is gained to the inside of the network, we are going to capture the traffic from both
points - inside and outside the network.
4.3 Modes of Operation of the NIC
In network communication, each device sends and receives data via a hardware
called Network Interface Controller(NIC). NICs are designed such that, once they
receive a packet, they check if it is meant for their host device. This is done by
checking if the destination address in the packet is the same as its own. If so, the
packet is accepted and passed onto to the host device. If not, the packet is dropped.
Since we want to capture the packets from all the devices in the network for our
analysis, we must make the NIC capture all the packets, regardless of the destination
address. This is enabled by changing the mode of operation of the NIC. The following
are the different modes of operation of the NIC.
• Normal Mode When operating normally, the NIC is associated with a network
and drops the packets unless the destination address is specifically its own, or
it is a broadcast or multicast packet.
• Promiscuous Mode When the NIC is set to operate in Promiscuous mode, it
is still associated with a network, but it no longer filters packets that are meant
only for itself. It takes all the packets that it receives and passes it up to the
CPU. Since it is associated with a network, it cannot catch packets that do not
belong to the network that it is associated with.
• Monitor Mode An interface, when set to operate in monitor mode, becomes
disassociated from any network. Hence, it catches all the packets that are in
the air within its reception range, regardless of the network the packets belong
to. Only wireless interfaces can be put in monitor mode.
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Hence to capture the network traffic externally, without joining the network, we
will use a Raspberry Pi device with one of its wireless interfaces set to monitor mode.
To capture the traffic from inside the network, we would use another Raspberry Pi
device with one of its wireless interfaces set to Promiscuous mode. This will ensure
data capture from both inside and outside the network. A single Raspberry Pi device
with two interfaces operating in promiscuous and monitor mode respectively can also
be used. But for the sake of efficiency and to prevent writing to the full capacity of
the internal storage of the Raspberry Pi, two separate devices are used.
4.4 Places and Number of Traffic Captures
The traffic capture was set up in two places. Both are real-time home environ-
ments; one has a lot of IoT devices and the other one does not. Lets call the former
Location A and the latter Location B.
• Location A At Location A, there are two networks - one is protected and the
other one is not password protected. The traffic is observed in two different
captures, one in Promiscuous mode within the protected network to catch the
internal traffic and the other in Monitor mode to capture all the traffic within
the range and hence will capture the entire traffic from the unprotected network
too. Location A is an individual house with nearby houses present a little distant
from each other. The duration of the data capture from outside the network and
on internal wired is 6 months, of which 4 months of data is used for analysis and
profiling and the rest of the data is used for testing our analysis. The duration
of the data capture on internal wireless is 3 months, of which 2 months of is
used for analysis and one month of data for testing the analysis.
• Location B At Location B, there is only one network, which is protected.
The traffic is observed in two different captures, one in Promiscuous mode to
capture the internal traffic and the other in Monitor mode to capture all the
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traffic within the reception range. Location B is an apartment in an apartment
complex setting with multiple apartments present very close to each other. The
duration of the experiment is 3 weeks.
Location A is the one with a lot of IoT devices and is the primary target for our
analysis. Location B does not have a lot of IoT devices. It is done to verify the
integrity of the primary analysis - to test that what is done in Location A can be
repeated else where too.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF DATA CAPTURED FROM OUTSIDE THE
NETWORK
Earlier we discussed that an intruder might just observe the traffic from outside
the network, without even joining the network. This poses a very serious security
risk. Because, we can prevent intruders from joining the network, but cannot stop
them from passively observing the traffic from outside. By capturing the packets that
come within their range, they might be able to learn a lot about our network, without
our consent. Hence to learn what information can be learned just from the packets
captured from outside the network, we will start this analysis.
Before delving deeper into the analysis, we should know what information is visible
from this point.
5.1 Data Encapsulation
Encapsulation is the wrapping of information, namely the headers, around the
actual data, namely the payload. This wrapped information contains the details nec-
essary to help facilitate the proper delivery of the packet to its intended destination.
The encapsulation varies depending on whether the data is transmitted over a
wired medium or a wireless medium. Since we are observing the data from afar,
without joining the network, we are going to capture wireless packets at this point.
A wireless network is composed of clients and one or more Access Points. Clients
communicate with each other and with the outside network via the Access Point.
This is called an Infrastructure network. There is another type of WLAN called Ad-
hoc, wherein clients directly communicate with each other without an Access Point.
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This is not very scalable and hence Infrastructure networks are commonly deployed.
In this setting, a wireless packet is encapsulated using the WLAN(Wireless LAN)
header.
Table 5.1 on page 18 shows a subset of the various fields that are present in an
IEEE 802.11 (IEEE specification for WLAN) header. This header is visible when
observing the packets passively even when the network is password-protected. The
rest of the contents of the packets - including the headers of OSI layers, are encrypted
and not visible at this point if the network is password-protected. With these visible
fields and the information available in them, we would try to get some insights about
the various devices present in our network. This would be possible for anyone passively
observing the traffic too, even without joining the network.
Table 5.1: A subset of fields present in the IEEE 802.11
Header
Field Name Description
frame.time Timestamp of the packet capture
frame.interface name The interface on which the packet was captured
frame.length Packet Length
frame.time delta Time elapsed after the capture of the previous packet
frame.protocols Protocols present in the packet
radiotap.dbm signal Signal Strength (SSI Signal)
wlan.fc.type 802.11 Packet Type (Data, Management, Control)
wlan.fc.subtype 802.11 Packet Subtype
wlan.fc.fromds Set to 1 if the packet is coming from DS
wlan.fc.tods Set to 1 if the packet is going towards the DS
wlan.fc.pwrmgt To indicate if clients are in Active or Sleep Mode
wlan.ra Receiver Address
wlan.ta Transmitter Address
wlan.da Destination Address
wlan.sa Source Address
wlan.bssid BSSID or AP Address
wlan.ssid SSID or Wi-Fi network name
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5.2 Identifying the various Networks present in the vicinity
and their degree of proximity
There are 3 types of frames in 802.11 namely - Data, Management and Control
Frames.
• Data: Data frames are used to carry the actual data from the upper layers.
• Control: Control frames are used to deliver the data by handling inherent
issues in wireless networks like collision avoidance and Hidden Node problems.
• Management: Management frames are used to maintain the wireless network.
Devices join and leave the network, get authenticated etc., all using Management
frames.
Table 5.2: Location A - List of Networks
Network Signal Strength (dBm)
KT -91
162 -85
165 -85
166 -85
KelleyTransit-Guest -87
TC8717TA5 -89
Verizon-MiFi7730L-1678 -91
HostNetwork -21
HostNetworkGuest -22
HP-Setup 14-M277 -43
DIRECT-roku-981-241500 -62
flynn Ext -89
Vehicle Hotspot -88
WIFIFC3D5E -90
WiFi Hotspot 0306 -89
Beacon frames are a subtype of Management frames that are transmitted pe-
riodically by Access Points in a network. They contain the field wlan.ssid which
is the network name. The field Signal Strength in Beacon frames indicates the
proximity and is given by radiotap.dbm antsignal. Beacon frames can be identi-
fied by the type subtype value under Frame Control fields. This value is given by
wlan.fc.type subtype and for Beacon frames, its value is 8.
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Hence by extracting the signal strength information from Beacon frames (for which
the source is the Access Point), we can more or less guess the degree of proximity of the
Access Point from our point of observation of the traffic and hence, come to a rough
estimate of the network’s degree of proximity. The signal strength is represented in
Decibel-milliwatt (dBm) in logarithmic scale. The closer the number is to zero, the
higher the value; that means the signal strength is stronger and hence, the network
is nearer. A number far from zero indicates a weak signal and a distant network.
• Location A We were able to identify 15+ different SSID’s from the captured
data. Table 5.2 on page 19 lists the networks identified at location A. The signal
strength mentioned is an average over the signal strength collected from many
days of capture data.
And this data correlates with the fact that ’HostNetwork’ and ’HostNetworkGuest’
are the home networks at Location A as we can see that their signal is the
strongest (signal strengths are 21 dBm and 22 dBm respectively). We also
see that the number of rest of the networks in proximity are few and most of
them are quite far from our point of observation (abrupt decrease in the signal
strength).
• Location B
Table 5.3 on page 22 shows the list of networks collected from Location B. Nearly
35+ networks were identified. The signal strength mentioned is an average over
the signal strength collected from many days of capture data.
’NeruppuDa’ is the name of the host network from where we observed the data
and we can see that it has the highest signal strength among all networks (-35.04
dBm) indicating the closest proximity. Also the number of networks within the
observation range and the gradual decrease in signal strength shows that this
location is an apartment setting where there are more number of devices per
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unit area compared to Location A which is an individual house and where only
around 15+ networks were observed within range.
Thus by merely taking the Beacon frames and extracting ssid and signal strength
information from them, anyone can identify the network that is present at any house.
The stronger the signal, the nearer is the network, to where the data is being captured.
From this point on, only data from Location A is used in the thesis for the sake of
brevity. To verify the integrity of the experiment, data from Location B was captured
for 3 weeks and the information presented in table 5.3 on page 22 is extracted from
the collected data. Thus verified, we would concentrate on the primary target of our
analysis and testing, Location A.
5.3 Identifying the Devices belonging to a Network
From the 802.11 header that we observe from this point, we would be able to see
the MAC addresses of the devices that are involved in the transmission of each packet.
Every device in the network is identified within its LAN using the MAC address. This
address is the address of the Network Interface Controller (NIC) that is present in each
device; devices communicate over the network via the network interfacing hardware
present in them. This MAC address is provided by the manufacturer of the NIC and
is unique globally; it is very rarely changed.
From the MAC addresses that we collected at this point, we can get a list unique
MAC addresses, each corresponding to a single device (two different MAC addresses
may represent a single device if two interfaces from the same device are online on
the same medium). From the data collected, we observed around 250+ unique MAC
addresses from Location A. Assuming some of the devices might have more than one
interface over the wireless medium, we can approximate the value to 200. Thus for
approximately 15 networks, there are 200 devices; hence around 13 devices per home.
This clearly illustrates the ongoing IoT phase. Earlier, home networks used to have
21
Table 5.3: Location B - List of Networks
Network Signal Strength (dBm)
975D6C -90.05
B6C5E0 -90.13
mae1934 -80.57
Niecy86 -87.32
4E1854 -91.08
2CB03A -89.02
2E805A -68.33
0236E0 -89.17
You want Internet or nah? -90.60
FE2678 -88.64
44931E -88.33
maverick -89.73
optimumwifi -88.69
optimumwifi Passpoint -88.40
DIRECT-Ng -85.12
edshah guest -55.81
AA68B8 -89.58
174D8C -79.11
edshah -56.47
9C86F4 -90.75
NeruppuDa -35.04
A047B4 -88.89
D98364 -90.00
GalaxyOne -90.90
110898 -81.00
WiFi Hotspot 2323 -87.43
bell44 -88.71
Sameer -83.96
Batterbee -88.63
NETGEAR86 -89.30
7ca4aa -89.88
LA ISLA PR -90.21
f4c2aa -88.32
B57710 -80.48
T-Mobile Broadband52 -88.11
1 or 2 laptops and 1 or 2 mobile phones connected to the Internet. Now every house
hold easily has 10+ devices connected online and it only keeps increasing.
In the previous section, we saw that Beacon frames contain SSID information and
are transmitted by the APs. Hence the source address in a Beacon Frame would
be the MAC address of an AP. From this information, we can get the list of APs
that belong to each network. To identify which AP a device belongs to, we have to
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examine the 4 address fields present in 802.11 packets namely Transmitter, Receiver,
Source and Destination along with the DS flag present under ’Frame Control’. Based
on the direction of the packet transmission, one of the 4 address fields would have the
MAC address of the AP.
Table 5.4: IEEE 802.11 - Values in Address Fields based on the DS Value
ToDS FromDS Address 1 Address 2 Address 3 Address 4 Interpretation
0 0 RA=DA TA=SA BSSID NA
Packet transmitted within the BSS;
Both Transmitter and Receiver
belong to the AP
1 0 RA=DA TA=BSSID SA NA
Packet comes from a
device outside BSS;
Receiver belongs to AP
0 1 RA=BSSID TA=SA DA NA
Packet is meant for a
device outside BSS;
Transmitter belongs to AP
1 1 RA=BSSID TA=BSSID DA SA
Packet relayed between
two APs;
From the information available from table 5.4 on page 23, we can associate a
device with the AP it belongs to. Using the list of network names and their APs got
previously and this list of APs and their devices, we can find out which network each
device belongs to.
Thus anyone passively observing the traffic from outside can get a list of APs
present under each network and then the devices present under each AP and associate
the device and the network name to get the list of devices present under each network.
5.4 Identifying the Type of Device and Vendor using OUI
Every MAC address is composed of 2 parts - OUI and the serial number. OUI is the
Organizationally Unique Identifier and identifies a manufacturer or vendor or other
organizations. According to IEEE, vendors or manufacturers are called assignees and
they buy the OUI from the IEEE Registration Authority. OUI is 24 bits long and
constitutes half of a MAC address, the first 3 octects. The serial number is also 24
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bits long and identifies a device uniquely. Hence a MAC address = OUI + serial
number.
Since we have the MAC addresses from the packet headers that we have collected,
we would be able to translate the OUI to identify the vendor. Tools like Wireshark
readily do it and give the resolved MAC address. Just by looking at the vendor or
the manufacturer, we would be able to say what kind of device it is most of the time.
Table 5.5 on page 24 lists a set of OUIs collected from the data that we captured
and the assignees that bought them or it belongs to.
Table 5.5: Example List of OUIs and Assignees
OUI Assignee
58-E2-8F Apple, Inc.
9c-f3-87 Apple, Inc.
40-98-ad Apple, Inc.
00-0f-00 Legra Systems, Inc.
c0-bd-d1 SAMSUNG ELECTRO-MECHANICS(THAILAND)
98-ca-33 Apple, Inc.
18-b4-30 Nest Labs Inc.
64-b5-c6 Nintendo Co.,Ltd
f8-04-2e SAMSUNG ELECTRO-MECHANICS(THAILAND)
b0-ee-7b Roku, Inc.
14-b7-f8 Technicolor CH USA Inc.
c0-56-27 Belkin International Inc.
28-56-5a Hon Hai Precision Ind. Co.,Ltd.
Hence just by using any widely available tool like Wireshark, anyone passively
observing the traffic from outside would be able to say what kind of devices are
present in a network.
Since we already know which devices belong to each network from the previous
section, we can resolve the MAC addresses of those devices and we would know exactly
the type of devices present in each network.
Table 5.6 on page 25 shows a subset of the list of devices belonging to network
’HostNetwork’ at Location A after OUI resolution. The Device Type is the actual
type of the device; this is not taken from the analysis but given for reference. Just by
24
Table 5.6: Location A - Subset of List of devices after OUI resolution
Network Name Access Point Address Device Address Device Type*
HostNetwork Apple ea:b3:5e
NestLabs 12:05:00 Nest Thermostat
NestLabs 13:7a:55 Nest Thermostat
NestLabs 14:48:4b Nest Thermostat
NestLabs 14:58:68 Nest Thermostat
NestLabs 15:3c:6e Nest Thermostat
NestLabs 2b:2b:61 Nest Thermostat
Nintendo 09:28:c7 Nintendo Console
Nintendo fa:9d:30 Nintendo Console
SamsungE e1:c2:0a Samsung TV
Legra 43:46:83 Raspberry Pi Device
HonHaiPr 08:bf:14 Printer
Apple 50:6a:f1 Apple TV
Apple 1c:ce:28 Laptop
Roku a4:6d:16 Roku
WistronN 34:2d:38 Washing Machine
WistronN 34:2d:61 Dryer
* Device Type is not inferred from the Analysis
looking at the resolved Device Address we can learn or at least guess the type of the
device. For example, Nest Thermostats - their OUI is resolved to NestLabs and from
that information we can say it must be either a thermostat or a doorbell or camera or
one of the IoT devices provided by NestLabs and hence an IoT device. From the OUI
resolution of Samsung TV, Apple TV and Laptop, we can guess it must a device from
the manufacturer concerned i.e, they must be either a smart TV or a smart phone
or Ipad or Macbook etc., and hence most probably a non-IoT device. The same is
the case for Nintendo console and Roku too. The washing machine and the dryer are
not that easy to guess. But we can definitely say that there are 6 Nest devices, 1
Samsung device, 1 Roku, 2 Nintendo consoles, 10+ Apple devices along with some
other devices in network ’HostNetwork’ at Location A just by looking at the resolved
MAC addresses.
Thus combining all the information got from previous sections, we can conclude
that anyone passively observing the traffic from outside the network can guess the
network name of the house he is collecting data from, find out the list of devices
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present in the network and also know the number of each type of device present in
that house.
5.5 Degree of Activeness of a Device
IoT devices are often small devices and are battery powered. Operating on bat-
tery serves a number of purposes including ease of installation anywhere, continued
operation even when the power supply is cut off (important for home applications
like Smart Doors and Smart Window systems) and also renders an aesthetic value.
Since they operate on battery, they try to conserve as much power as possible. Their
hardware is also designed in such a way so as to consume as less power as possible;
they typically have low power processors, small memory, lower storage capacity etc.,
- resources that are just enough to perform the one task they are designed to do. On
the other hand, devices like laptops and smart phones do not have these constraints.
Even though they do have battery, its capacity is much bigger than that of IoT de-
vices and can be charged regularly (typically designed to last for a whole day before
recharging again). They also perform a variety of tasks like surfing the Internet, play-
ing media files, making calls, sending and receiving messages etc., Hence their system
resources are also quite high to cope up with performing a variety of intensive tasks.
Devices go into Power Save mode after sending a signal to the router that they
are going to Sleep. This is done by sending a packet called NULL frame, which is a
subtype of Data Frames. NULL frames are exclusively sent from the clients to the
Access Point. When the client is ready to go to Sleep, it sends a NULL frame to
the Access Point with the PWR MGT flag set to 1. On receiving it, the AP will
understand that the client is going to Sleep and will start buffering the packets that
are meant for the client until the client wakes up. Clients wake up, either when they
receive a stimulus from the environment (eg: Smart Light bulbs going to Sleep when
there is no motion detected in the environment and coming back to operation when
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there is movement in the vicinity) or by following their internal time clock. Either
way, when they wake up, they again send a NULL frame to the Access Point with
the PWR MGT flag set to 0. The AP then understands that the device has woken
up and resumes sending packets to it. Clients also use NULL frames when they are
roaming and are going to switch from one network to the next.
We are going to look at the power management data collected from each device
and try to learn about how active a device is over the wireless interface.
Table 5.7: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Comparison of One Day’s Duration
of Sleep and Active States of an Apple TV, Nest Thermostat and Access Point
Apple 50:6a:f1 (Apple TV) NestLabs 15:3c:6e (Nest Thermostat) Apple ea:b3:5e (AP)
Active Sleep Active Sleep Active
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
3 72 3 69 3 81 3 22 86118 100
6 4 6 4 6 2 6 6
9 2 9 1 9 1 9 3
12 5 12 6 12 12 12 4
24 1 15 1 15 0 15 3
45 1 27 1 18 1 18 3
81 5 39 1 21 2 21 4
102 1 81 5 51 0 51 4
363 1 93 1 63 0 63 9
Active > Sleep Sleep > Active Only Active
Dur. - Duration, Trans. - Transitions
Data included is the data from 1 day which was selected randomly
Table 5.7 on page 27 shows the percentage of transitions into Active or Sleep mode
for each duration segment for 3 different devices present in Location A under network
’HostNetwork’.
Figure 5.1 on page 28 shows the variations in the degree of two devices - Samsung
TV and Nest Thermostat at Location A.
By looking at the power management state data of all devices, we are able to see
differences in the duration they are Active, clearly highlighting the different types
of devices. Device Apple ea:b3:5e acts as Access Point for this network. This is
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Table 5.8: Location A - Network ’HostNetworkGuest’ - Comparison of One Day’s
Duration of Sleep and Active States of devices Apple 4a:aa:13, Apple 3e:39:83 and
Access Point
Apple 4a:aa:13 Apple 3e:39:83 82:5e:b3:ea:96:e0 (AP)
Active Sleep Active Sleep Active
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
Dur.
(secs)
% of
Trans.
3 50 3 65 3 89 3 83 85590 100
6 4 9 8 6 3 6 5
9 8 21 4 9 2 9 2
12 4 36 4 12 1 12 2
15 8 45 4 15 1 15 1
18 8 315 4 18 < 1 18 1
36 4 612 4 42 < 1 30 1
54 4 1338 4 102 < 1 102 < 1
63 4 4704 4 1014 < 1 1116 < 1
Sleep > Active Active ≈ Sleep Only Active
Dur. - Duration, Trans. - Transitions
Data included is the data from 1 day which was selected randomly
Figure 5.1: Location A - Comparison of Degree of Activeness of Samsung TV and
Nest Thermostat - 1 day’s data
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identified by the fact that it does not send any NULL frames (though one some days
it does send - in those periods, it is not acting as the AP); only clients send the
NULL frames to Access Points. (It was also identified as the AP simply by looking
at the value present in field wlan.bssid in the collected packets ). Nest Thermostat
devices spend more time in the Sleep mode than in the Active mode. Nearly 50% to
80% or above transitions to Active state lasted for only 3 or less than 3 seconds. On
the other hand, only 12% to 25% transitions to Sleep state lasted for 3 or less than
3 seconds. The second most prominent duration in Active state is 9 to 12 seconds
which is the duration of nearly 12% to 23% transitions. In sleep mode, the next
prominent duration is 60 to 63 seconds where 5% to 14% of the transitions last. This
behaviour is typical of IoT devices; they go into Sleep mode as much as possible to
conserve power as they are battery operated. Apple TV spent time equally in both
the modes. Nearly 69% to 94% transitions spent 3 or less than 3 seconds in both
Active and Sleep state. This means it toggles frequently between these 2 states and
has not been Active much on the wireless interface. Samsung TV is Active 100%
most of the time it is powered ON. Most of the days, no data was collected about
the device in Sleep state. This could mean that the device was powered off when not
in use most of the time. Hence in comparison, Samsung TV was used more at the
site of the data collection than the Apple TV. Also from the collected data, duration
of Active state ranges from 2 hours (which is a Tuesday) to 10+ hours (weekends).
Roughly speaking, this could be the duration of hours of watching TV and it makes
sense that more TV was watched during the weekends than on the weekdays. The
Raspberry Pi was active 100% of the time on all days because it was constantly
collecting data 24x7. Not much power management information is available about
Ipads, Iphone and Nintendo devices on wireless interface; NULL frames from them
were not captured in our data collection. This could be because the devices are out
of range from the point of our data capture. Also very minimal or no wireless packets
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were captured from Insteon Hub, Mac Minis, Laptop, TP-Link, Washing machine
and dryer, Printer; this could be because these devices are connected and function
actively over the wired interface and do not use wireless interface in general. Roku
also behaves the same way; the packets collected from Roku indicate that it is always
in Sleep mode over the wireless interface. But it is very Active in the wired interface.
Hence it is performing and streaming all the data over the wired interface and not
much is happening on the wireless interface. Apple device Apple de:65:91 exhibits a
behaviour similar to that of Apple TV. Consistently, more than 90% of its transitions
to both Active and Sleep states lasted for 3 or less than 3 seconds As said before, this
means it toggles very frequently between the two states. Apple devices Apple c7:eb:05
and Apple 61:b1:70 spend slightly more time in the Sleep state than in the Active
state, most of the time. This means that they are trying to conserve power, though
not as stringently as Nest Thermostat devices and hence they could be considered to
fall in the IoT device category. Device Apple 86:34:26 is always in the sleep state.
From the data collected, it was never Active. But we find that it is highly Active
in the wired interface. Hence, we conclude that it does not actively operate over the
wireless interface. Only very minimal data was collected from device Apple 15:b9:21;
from the data collected, we see that it spends more time in the Active state than in
the sleep state. We can say that the device is switched OFF when not in use and
while it is powered ON, it spends more time in the Active state. Hence it falls in
the non-IoT device category. Device Apple 0f:fd:22, on most days, spends more time
in the Active state, just like Apple 15:b9:21; but on some days, it spends way more
time in the Sleep state. This leads to the conclusion that it is not an IoT device to
exhibit a consistent power-save-mode behaviour; rather it stays in Active or Sleep
mode according to usage. Device Apple 0c:59:e5, which also had data only from a
few days, spent time equally in both Active and Sleep State. eGauge devices were
not active on the wireless interface; they operated actively over the wired interface.
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Let us move on to devices on the network ’HostNetworkGuest’. Access Point for
this network is device 82:5e:b3:ea:96:e0. It was identified based on the same grounds
as AP of network ’HostNetwork’. Device Apple 4a:aa:13 was more Active on some
days and spent more time in Sleep mode on other days. This mixed behaviour is
typical of non-IoT devices whose rate of activeness depends purely on their usage.
Device Apple e8:26:91 spends more time in the Sleep state most of the days. But
active states do last considerably longer; they are not as short as the ones typical
of IoT devices. Apple 3e:39:83 spends time equally in both the states; also, most of
the time some 75% to more than 90% of the transitions last for only 3 or less than 3
seconds. That means it toggles quite frequently between the two states. Apart from
this, it does not do anything on the wireless interface. For devices Apple 5b:81:a1
and Apple a5:db:34, data from only a few days were collected, even on the wired
interface. This leads to the conclusion that they were switched off when not in use.
From the collected data, on some days, they spend more time in the Sleep state and
on some days, they spend more time in the Active state. Therefore, they toggle
between the two states based on usage and hence, fall under the non-IoT device
category. Raspberry Pi device was active 100% of the time. This is expected as the
device is continuously collecting data 24x7. One of the Nintendo devices present in
network ’HostNetwork’, joins the guest network at times. But here also it exhibits the
same behaviour. Not much power management information is available on the wireless
interface but it is very active on the wired interface. From device SamsungE 16:fb:15,
data was collected from only one day. This could be a guest device, a device that
joined the network only for that day and never came into this network again. The
data shows that 92% of its transitions to both Active and Sleep state last for only
3 or less than 3 seconds, meaning it did not spend longer time in any state; it just
toggles between the two states.
31
Device Apple 39:19:61, belonging to network ’TC8717TA5’, spent more time in
the Active state on some days and more time in Sleep state on other days. This leads
to the conclusion that it toggled between the states according to usage and hence, it
is a non-IoT device. Device Apple e1:32:01, also present on the same network, was
always in the Sleep state on the days the data was captured. This means that it was
active over the wired interface whenever it was switched ON, as we can see its traffic
on wired interface. Devices Advantec f5:cf:a4, Advantec f5:d3:a0, Advantec f5:d3:ce,
Advantec f7:87:c5, Z-Com a2:a9:34, BelkinIn a4:a2:fe, HonHaiPr da:c3:73 and Hon-
HaiPr fc:3d:62 from networks 165, 167, 166, 170, 161, flynn Ext, Hightower Power-1
and WIFIFC3D5E respectively had no power management data from them. The ab-
sence of NULL frames originating from them as well as the information from their
traffic on the wireless interface (from field wlan.bssid) show that they are Access
Points.
Hence, just by looking at the power management information from outside the
network, we are able to see how active a device is over the wireless interface. Hence,
if an intruder wants to identify an Access Point (which is usually the router in home
environments), he could just search for devices from which NULL frames do not
originate. Once the router is identified, he could use this information to hack it by
some means and gain access into the network, monitor all the traffic over the wireless
interface as every device in the wireless interface communicates via the router. And
just by filtering devices that spend more time in the Sleep state than in the Active
state consistently, he can identify IoT devices, devices that do not have robust security
and hence, vulnerable and easy to hack.
5.6 How often do Devices change states ?
We saw earlier that IoT devices, since they are battery operated and have minimal
resources, try to conserve as much power as possible by going into sleep mode as much
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as possible. Non-IoT devices do not have this need as they have greater resources at
hand and a large battery and power to use.
Hence, first we will look at how frequently devices toggle between Active and Sleep
state.
Also, we will check how consistent are these devices in toggling between Active
and Sleep states. If they are IoT devices, they would always be performing a few
closely related tasks. Eg: The only job of a smart light is to switch ON whenever it
detects any motion in the vicinity and to switch OFF when there is no motion for
some period; it may send this data over to a remote server for further processing.
Also IoT devices would consistently try to save power as much as possible. Hence the
frequency with which they toggle between the states should remain consistent over
the days. But non-IoT devices, on the other hand, perform a variety of tasks; they
also do not try to go into power save mode as often as the IoT devices. They stay
Active as long as they are in usage and that usage varies vastly user to user and from
time to time.
Figure 5.2: Location A - Comparison of Frequency of State Change of Samsung TV
and Nest - 2 hour’s data
First let us take network ’HostNetwork’. Figure 5.2 on page 33 shows the differ-
ences in the rate at which state transitions are made between Samsung TV and Nest
Thermostat. Access Point (Router) and Raspberry Pi device make 0 transitions per
hour; that means they do not change states at all. The variance for these devices’
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Figure 5.3: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Mean of Number of Transitions
per hour and their fluctuation over 120+ days
0.00
50.00
100.00
150.00
200.00
250.00
300.00
350.00
400.00
450.00
Ac
ce
ss
 P
oi
nt
Ra
sp
be
rr
y 
Pi
Ap
pl
e_
5b
:8
1:
a1
Ap
pl
e_
a5
:d
b:
34
Sa
ms
un
gE
_1
6:
fb
:1
5
Ap
pl
e_
4a
:a
a:
13
Ap
pl
e_
e8
:2
6:
91
Ap
pl
e_
3e
:3
9:
83
M
e
a
n
 
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
S
t
a
t
e
 
T
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
/
H
o
u
r
Device
Mean
Standard Deviation
Figure 5.4: Location A - Network ’HostNetworkGuest’ - Mean of Number of Transi-
tions per hour and their fluctuation over 120+ days
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Table 5.9: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Inference - Mean of Number of
Transitions per hour and their fluctuation 120+ days
Device Mean Variance Comments
Access Point (ea:b3:5e) 0.0 0.0
Zero Transitions, Zero Variance,
Always Active
Raspberry Pi 1 (35:bb:d5) 0.0 0.0
Zero Transitions, Zero Variance,
Always Active
Raspberry Pi 2 (43:46:83) 0.0 0.0
Zero Transitions, Zero Variance,
Always Active
Roku AP (72:1a:5f) 0.0 0.0
Zero Transitions, Zero Variance,
Always Sleep
Roku a4:6d:16 0.0 0.0
Zero Transitions, Zero Variance,
Always Sleep
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) 0.03 0.07
Negligible mean, Negligible Variance,
Active most of the time over all days
Printer (08:bf:14) 2.0 2.0 Very small mean and variance, only few days’ data available
Apple 0c:59:e5 17.23 6.3
Very small mean, Very small variance,
Only few days’ data available
Apple 0f:fd:22 40.44 1543.23
Small mean, Comparatively small variance,
More time in a state according to usage
Apple 15:b9:21 102.62 488.28
Comparatively small mean and variance,
More time in Active state
Nest Thermostat (2b:2b:61) 138.35 1658.62
Comparatively small mean and variance
More time consistently in Sleep state over the days
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 136.94 1935.57
Comparatively small mean and variance
More time consistently in Sleep state over the days
Nest Thermostat (13:7a:55) 130.83 1644.26
Comparatively small mean and variance
More time consistently in Sleep state over the days
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 140.46 1858.48
Comparatively small mean and variance
More time consistently in Sleep state over the days
Nest Thermostat 132.11 1493.21
Comparatively small mean and variance
More time consistently in Sleep state over the days
Nest Thermostat 135.38 1382.57
Comparatively small mean and variance
More time consistently in Sleep state over the days
Apple 61:b1:70 61.95 8443.91
Small mean and comparatively high variance, More time in
Sleep state but frequency of transitions fluctuates a lot
Not as stringent as Nest Thermostat in conserving power
Apple c7:eb:05 68.3 11125.83
Small mean and comparatively high variance, More time in
Sleep state but frequency of transitions fluctuates a lot
Not as stringent as Nest Thermostat in conserving power
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) 887.98 514256.0
Very high mean frequency and variance
Just toggles between the two states
Not much activity in wireless interface
Apple de:65:91 1042.39 833176.83
Very high mean frequency and variance
Just toggles between the two states
Not much activity in wireless interface
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Table 5.10: Location A - Network ’HostNetworkGuest’ - Inference - Mean of Number
of Transitions per hour and their fluctuation over 120+ days
Device Mean Variance Comments
82:5e:b3:ea:96:e0 0.0 0.0 Zero Transitions, Zero variance, Always active
Raspberry Pi 1 (35:bb:d5) 0.0 0.0 Zero Transitions, Zero variance, Always active
Apple a5:db:34 1.95 3.68
Small mean and variance,
Longer duration in a state and consistent over the days
Apple 5b:81:a1 2.9 4.47
Small mean and variance,
Longer duration in a state and consistent over the days
SamsungE 16:fb:15 24.0 0.0
Small mean and no variance, Data from only one day,
Probably a guest device
Apple 4a:aa:13 26.79 6729.07
Small mean, High variance,
Longer duration in a state, but duration fluctuates greatly
Apple e8:26:91 37.19 4979.43
Small mean, High variance,
Longer duration in a state, but duration fluctuates greatly
Apple 3e:39:83 237.4 44192.66
High Mean, Very High Variance, Frequently toggles between
the two states, Fluctuates greatly in duration
mean frequency over a period of 120+ days is zero, meaning their behaviour is exactly
the same over all those days. This is reasonable as we saw earlier that they always
stay in the Active mode (to serve other devices and to collect traffic data respectively)
and never transition to sleep mode. Roku also made zero transitions and its variance
over all days is also 0. Since it is not active over the wireless interface, it always
stays in sleep mode. The mean frequency of transitions made by Samsung TV is very
small. This means most of the time, it stayed in one state and transitioned only rarely.
It’s variance is also very negligible. This is in accordance with our observation before
where Samsung TV stayed in Active mode most of the time most of the days. Devices
Apple 0c:59:e5 and Apple 0f:fd:22 have lower frequencies of transition, meaning they
spend longer duration in a state before transitioning to the next. Nest Thermostats
have a higher frequency of transitioning than the devices mentioned so far. This is
in par with our previous observation; Nest Thermostats go into Sleep mode as much
as possible to conserve energy; they do not spend longer duration in Active state.
And their variance is also comparatively low; this means they exhibit this behaviour
consistently over these 90+ days. Devices Apple 61:b1:70 and Apple c7:eb:05, though
their mean frequency is less than that of Nest Thermostat devices, make transitions
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that fluctuate greatly over the days; variance is higher. As said before, though they
try to conserve power, they do not do it as stringently and consistently as the Nest
Thermostat devices. The mean frequency of Apple TV and Apple de:65:91 show that
they keep toggling between the Sleep and Active states very frequently. This is in
accordance with our observation from the previous section - their duration in both
Active and Sleep states lasted for 3 or less than 3 seconds most of the time.
Second, let us take network ’HostNetworkGuest’. Access Point and Raspberry Pi
devices make 0 transitions per hour. Because, as we saw before they are always up
and running. Their variance is also zero. Hence, this behaviour is consistent over the
90+ days. Less data was collected from Apple 5b:81:a1 and Apple a5:db:34 compared
to the other devices. From the data collected, their mean frequency and variance are
low. This means they spend a lot of time in a state before transitioning to the next
and this is consistent over the days (for the days we collected the data). Devices
Apple 4a:aa:13 and Apple e8:26:91 have lower frequencies of transition. Hence they
spend considerably longer duration in any state. Their variances are high; hence the
duration they spend in a state fluctuates considerably over the days. As discussed
before, they must fall under the non-IoT device category as IoT devices would be
consistently spending more time in the Sleep state. Device Apple 3e:39:83 has a very
high mean frequency of transition and variance. This adds strength to our previous
observation that it keeps toggling between the two states with most of its transitions
lasting for 3 or less than 3 seconds.
Since we are observing the data in monitor mode, we were able to capture data
from devices that were not present in the networks ’HostNetwork’ and ’HostNet-
workGuest’. Simply all packets within the observable range were captured. Device
Apple 39:19:61 belonging to network ’TC8717TA5’ has a mean frequency of 7.0 tran-
sitions per hour; its variance is mid-range about 108.1. This means that they spend
longer duration in a state and the duration varies over the days. Varying duration as
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well as longer duration in Active state over the Sleep state leads to the conclusion that
this device is a non-IoT device. Device Apple e1:32:01, also belonging to the same
network, has zero mean and zero variance; this means that it always stayed in one
state and never transitioned to the other state. From the data from previous section,
we know that it always stayed in Sleep state. Hence this result is consistent with
that observation. Devices Advantec f5:cf:a4, Advantec f5:d3:a0, Advantec f5:d3:ce,
Advantec f7:87:c5, Z-Com a2:a9:34, BelkinIn a4:a2:fe, HonHaiPr da:c3:73 and Hon-
HaiPr fc:3d:62 from networks 165, 167, 166, 170, 161, flynn Ext, Hightower Power-1
and WIFIFC3D5E respectively all had zero mean and zero variance; no data was
received from them. This yet again proves that these devices are Access Points of
their respective networks.
Hence by combining the information from both how frequently the devices change
states and how active the devices are, an intruder can easily identify access points and
IoT devices, without even joining the network. For access points, since NULL frames
do not originate from them, their mean frequency of transitions per hour (or in a day)
and variance will be zero. For devices that are in Active or Sleep mode all the time
would also have the same result with regards to mean frequency and variance, but
they will have NULL frames originating from them. This would easily distinguish an
Access Point from a device that is 100% either active or asleep. Devices that have
a comparatively mid-range mean and variance are devices that spend a considerably
long duration in a state and are consistent in that behaviour over the days. Data from
the previous section will give information as to whether that state is Active or Sleep;
devices spending more time asleep are the IoT devices. The rest of the devices, those
that either spend more time in the Active state or is not consistent in the duration
they spend in the states, would be non-IoT devices.
38
5.7 Traffic associated with a device
Network Traffic can be defined as the amount of data that is circulating in a
network. The various devices present in the network contribute to this network traffic
by either sending or receiving data via the network. The basic unit of network traffic
is packets. While the header length across various layers of the network remain the
same (sometimes it may vary with the inclusion of optional fields), the payload or the
actual data that is transmitted or received varies from device to device, task to task.
And this traffic is measured in bytes. We get this information from the length of
the packets traveling across the network. This information is available in the packet
header.
By device traffic, we mean the data that is either sent or received by a particular
device; hence the total traffic sent and received by every device constitute the network
traffic. While IoT devices are designed for a specific purpose and they usually do one
specific task or tasks related to that specific purpose, non-IoT devices are designed
to perform a variety of tasks. Therefore, the volume of device traffic for an IoT
device must be significantly lesser than that of a non-IoT device; because IoT-devices
would be generating traffic from or for a particular task whereas non-devices will be
doing the same for a variety of tasks. This difference between the nature of the tasks
among the two types of devices not only varies the volume of traffic but also the type
of traffic.
5.7.1 Content Type of Packets associated with a Device
Since we are observing the packets from outside without joining the network, we
will not be able to get any information regarding the content of the packet or the type
of protocol that is used. Without the protocol information, it is difficult to pinpoint
exactly what these devices are doing. But externally, we have another information
available that can be used for this purpose to an extent - type of packet sent.
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Wireless traffic can be categorized into 3 types of packets according to the IEEE
802.11 specification. They are,
• Data: Data frames are used to carry the actual data from the upper layers.
• Control: Control frames are used to deliver the data by handling inherent
issues in wireless networks like collision avoidance and Hidden Node problems.
• Management: Management frames are used to maintain the wireless network.
Devices join and leave the network, get authenticated etc., all using Management
frames.
We are going to focus solely on the data packets now. Data packets have sub-
types within them namely - Data(Type 32), NULL(Type 36), Data+Contention Free
Acknowledgement(Type 33), Data+Contention Free Poll(Type 34) etc., All these sub-
types serve different purposes in transmitting the data. For example, subtype Data
packets(Type 32) carry the actual data, NULL frames(Type 36) are used to send
power management information to the Access Point based on which the AP either
sends the data or buffers it until the device wakes up again. Hence, by looking at
the type of packets sent by each device, we will be able to get an idea of the type of
content that is actually being carried in the packets merely by observing them from
outside the network.
Table 5.11 on page 41 shows the composition of subtypes of packets under the
Type Data packets that are transmitted from and received by each device under
network ’HostNetwork’.
Of all the subtypes under Type Data, we only see subtypes 32 and 36 involved.
Access Point transmits 99.75% of subtype 32 packets, i.e., purely data and only very
negligible subtype 36, i.e., NULL frames. This goes to show that most of the time it
acts as an Access Point without any NULL frames originating from it. Very rarely
it sends NULL frames; during those times it was not acting as an Access Point.
Nintendo devices transmit subtype 32 packets all the time; they do not send NULL
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Table 5.11: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Average Percentage of Types of
Packets transmitted and received in a day
Device Transmitted Received
Percentage of
SubType 32 (%)
Percentage of
SubType 36 (%)
Percentage of
SubType 32 (%)
Percentage of
SubType 36 (%)
Access Point 99.75 0.24 7.77 92.22
Nest Thermostat (2b:2b:61) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Nest Thermostat (13:7a:55) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Nest Thermostat (14:48:4b) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Nest Thermostat (15:3c:6e) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Apple TV 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Samsung TV 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Roku AP (72:1a:5f) 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.00
Roku Device (a4:6d:16) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Printer (08:bf:14) 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Nintendo (09:28:c7) 100.00 0.0 100.00 0.0
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 100.00 0.0 100.00 0.0
Raspberry Pi 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple de:65:91 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple c7:eb:05 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple 86:34:26 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple 61:b1:70 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Apple 15:b9:21 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple 0f:fd:22 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple 0c:59:e5 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
This average is the average over 120+ days
Table 5.12: Location A - Network ’HostNetworkGuest’ - Average Percentage of Types
of Packets transmitted and received in a day
Device Transmitted Received
Percentage of
SubType 32 (%)
Percentage of
SubType 36 (%)
Percentage of
SubType 32 (%)
Percentage of
SubType 36 (%)
Access Point 97.7 2.29 1.2 98.79
Apple 4a:aa:13 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Apple e8:26:91 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Apple 3e:39:83 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple 5b:81:a1 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Apple a5:db:34 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Raspberry Pi 0.0 100.00 0.0 100.00
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 100.00 0.0 100.00 0.0
SamsungE 16:fb:15 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
This average is the average over 120+ days
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frames at all. Rest of the devices like Nest Thermostats, Roku, Laptop, Printer,
Raspberry Pi and Apple devices send NULL frames 100% of the time. This means,
other than sending power management information (i.e., if they are awake or asleep)
to the AP, they do not do much on the wireless interface. No information is available
about MacMinis, Washing Machine and Dryer, Insteon Hub etc., No packets were
captured from them over the wireless interface at this point. This shows that they
are either active only over the wired interface or we are too far from the devices to
capture their wireless packets from the air. Only very minimal packets were captured
wirelessly from Ipads and a Laptop. But it is impossible that they did not generate
any wireless traffic. Hence we conclude that the packets sent by those devices were
out of range to capture from our point of data capture.
Coming to the received packets, the access point received both Data packets and
NULL frames. 7.77% of the time, it received Type 32 packets and received Type 36
packets 92.22% of the time. Therefore it receives type 36 packets sent by the rest of
the devices most of the time. Nest Thermostat devices did not receive any type of
packets. This is reasonable because there is no reason for any device to contact the
Nest Thermostat nor for the Nest Thermostat to receive any data from any other
device. All it has to do is to collect data about the environment (which it will do
using the on-board sensors) and send them to the remote server. It is assumed at this
point that the collected data is sent via the wired interface. Hence it does not receive
any type of packets. Apple TV does not receive any type of packet and Samsung
TV receives only type 36 packets. This goes to show that all their streaming and
receiving content happens over the wired interface. Nintendo devices, just like their
transmission, received only Data subtype of packets. Rest of the devices either receive
nothing or receive only type 36 frames.
Table 5.12 on page 41 shows the composition of subtypes of packets under the
Type Data packets that are transmitted from each device under network ’HostNet-
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workGuest’. Here also, we find only subtypes 32 and 36. The AP of the guest network
has 97.7% packets to be of subtype 32, i.e., data packets and 2.29% NULL frames.
Hence, like the AP of the main network, this device acts as an AP most of the time
by not sending any NULL frames and sends them only rarely. During those times,
it could not have functioned as an AP. One of the Nintendo devices from the main
network joins the guest network sometimes. Here also, it sends only data packets
and no NULL frames. Rest of the devices namely Raspberry Pi, Samsung and Ap-
ple devices all send only NULL frames to the AP and do not send any other data.
Hence, these devices are not active over the wireless interface other than sending
power management information.
Coming over to the received packets, the AP of the guest network also shows
the same result as the AP of the main network. It receives only 1.2% of Type 32
packets and 98.79% of type 36 packets. The Nintendo device, as it behaved in the
main network, receives only Data subtype packets. Rest of the devices either receive
nothing or receive only NULL frames. This leads to the conclusion that these devices,
other than letting the AP know whether they are asleep or active, do not do anything
else on the wireless interface. It is assumed at this point that Raspberry Pi must be
active over the wired interface. It must be sending the collected data over the wired
interface. The Samsung and other Apple devices, since we don’t know their type,
could be active over the wired interface or they could be out of range from the point
of data collection or they could simply be inactive.
Table 5.13 on page 44 shows the composition of the types of packets that are
transmitted and received by devices from networks other than the ones present at
the house where we are capturing the data; they are present in the vicinity, may
be in the houses nearby. All the Access Point devices send only subtype 32 frames.
For the APs, this behaviour is expected as NULL frames originate from the client
devices and are received by the APs. For other devices that are not access points,
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we have managed to capture only type 36 packets. On the receiving end, only AP
Technico 07:d7:ab has received NULL frames, only NULL frames. For other devices,
we do not have any data about the reception of packets. Since these are devices
that are from networks that are a little distant from the point of our data capture,
may be these devices were out of range from the point of data collection for us to
capture packets that were sent to these devices. We were able to capture NULL
frames transmitted by them because those were sent to APs and the APs were within
our range as we were able to capture packets transmitted from them.
Table 5.13: Location A - Other Networks - Average Percentage of Types of Packets
transmitted and received in a day
Network Device Transmitted Received
% of
SubType
32
% of
SubType
36
% of
SubType
32
% of
SubType
36
TC8717TA5 Apple 02:f4:2d 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
TC8717TA5 Apple 13:40:f3 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
TC8717TA5 Apple 28:8f:31 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
TC8717TA5 Apple 39:19:61 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
TC8717TA5 Apple e1:32:01 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
TC8717TA5 AP (Technico 07:d7:ab) 100.00 0.0 0.0 100.00
165 AP (Advantec f5:cf:a4) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
167 AP (Advantec f5:d3:a0) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
166 AP (Advantec f5:d3:ce) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
170 AP (Advantec f7:87:c5) 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
flynn Ext AP (BelkinIn a4:a2:fe) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hightower Power-1 AP (HonHaiPr da:c3:73) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
WIFIFC3D5E AP (HonHaiPr fc:3d:62) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 4 Motorola fa:89:3e 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 4 Motorola 1d:d1:10 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 6 Apple ea:04:04 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 6 Apple a4:11:69 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 6 Apple 0e:38:9c 0.0 100.00 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 8 6a:31:96:8c:d9:fc 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 8 82:e2:f7:a6:0d:bc 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unknown NW 16 AP (SenaoNet 11:c4:ee) 100.00 0.0 0.0 0.0
Hence, by just capturing the packets from outside the network without joining it
and by reading the type and subtype values in the packet, an intruder will be able to
get a rough idea of the contents and purpose of the packet. He will be able to identify
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the Access Point (which is also the Router in home networks) by identifying the device
that transmits data frames almost always and negligible or no NULL frames.
5.7.2 How much Traffic do Devices Send and Receive ?
Now that we have established the type of content transmitted by the devices, let
us take into consideration the volume of traffic that is associated with each device.
Volume of traffic can be a key indicator in identifying the type of device. Devices
like laptops, TVs, Roku etc., must have a high volume of traffic as they will be used
for a variety of purposes like streaming video, playing music, browsing the internet,
running software applications that interact with the cloud etc., IoT devices, on the
other hand, will not incur a very high traffic as their only purpose is to collect data
about the environment and send it to a remote server. Hence, volume of traffic
observed externally could be a very good indicator of the type of device unless the
device is also connected via the wired medium and is using that over the wireless
medium for its activities.
Along with examining the traffic volume that each device is associated with, we
would also try to group the devices that are similar in their traffic volumes. Doing
this for every parameter that we are analyzing would give us a unique profile about
each device when combining all the parameters.
Table 5.14: Traffic Volume Limits for Traffic Categorization
Range (Bytes) Traffic Category
0 - 100 Very Low
101 - 500 Low
501 - 1000 Mid-High
1001 - 5000 High
5001 - 10000 Very High
10001 and above Extremely High
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Table 5.14 on page 45 shows the categories that we are going to divide the devices
into, based on their traffic volume. This volume includes traffic that is both sent and
received by the device.
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Figure 5.5: Location A - Device Traffic in a minute - Sent and Received - 2 hours
Figure 5.5 on page 46 shows a sample traffic of subset of devices present in network
’HostNetwork’ at Location A for a duration of 2 hours. From the figure, we are able to
see that the device with the highest traffic is the Access Point. Every device, in order
to communicate on the wireless interface, has to communicate with the Access Point
(Router), which relays the information to the destination device. Hence, in any given
network, it is the Access Point (or the router) that would have the highest traffic on
the wireless interface. Device Apple de:65:91 has highly fluctuating traffic ranging
from 100 bytes to more than 5000 bytes (this does not mean that the device exhibits
this behaviour at all times) and stops abruptly mid-way at around 5pm. This could
be the time the device was switched off. We can see that the Nest Thermostat devices
resemble very closely in their traffic volumes as they both carry out the exact same
functionality. We see that the device Roku has a lower traffic volume than that of the
device Apple de:65:91 in this time frame and its traffic also abruptly stops at around
5pm. May be Roku was also switched off at the same time. Raspberry Pi’s traffic
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Table 5.15: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’
- Mean of Average Traffic generated in a minute
over all days
Device
Avg. of
Mean(Bytes)
Traffic
Category
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 55.93 Very Low
Apple 86:34:26 62.4 Very Low
Samsung TV 63.43 Very Low
Raspberry Pi 90.18 Very Low
Apple 0c:59:e5 171.5 Low
Apple 61:b1:70 366.19 Low
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 303.89 Low
Nest Thermostat (13:7a:55) 313.47 Low
Nest Thermostat (14:48:4b) 323.65 Low
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 336.58 Low
Nest Thermostat (15:3c:6e) 330.45 Low
Nest Thermostat (2b:2b:61) 326.54 Low
Apple c7:eb:05 569.63 Mid-High
Apple 0f:fd:22 792.37 Mid-High
Apple 15:b9:21 627.2 Mid-High
Nintendo (09:28:c7) 641.01 Mid-High
Roku Access Point 918.39 Mid-High
Roku Device 924.62 Mid-High
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 1231.17 High
Apple TV 1769.52 High
Apple de:65:91 4927.26 High
Router 17442.26 Extremely High
To get this Average of Mean value, first traffic per minute was cal-
culated and its mean over a day is calculated. Then an average of
all the mean traffic per minute per day day is taken. Average is over
120+ days
is very minimal. This is in accordance with our observation from previous section
where we saw it sent only NULL frames and did not do anything else. Most probably,
the device is sending the collected data to the remote server via the wired interface.
We see that the Samsung TV is operated for an hour from roughly 4.10pm to 5
pm. All these streaming devices - Roku, Samsung TV and Apple de:65:91 (possibly
a streaming device because of its high traffic) switching off at around the same time
could mean that the occupants are leaving the house. This is an illustration of the
traffic volume of various devices over a duration of 2 hours.
From table 5.15 on page 47, we can clearly see the differences in the traffic volume
of the various devices present under nerwork ’HostNetwork’. Devices Apple 86:34:26,
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Table 5.16: Location A - Network
HostNetworkGuest - Mean of Aver-
age Traffic generated in a minute
over all days
Device
Avg. of
Mean(Bytes)
Traffic
Category
Raspberry Pi 80.73 Very Low
Apple e8:26:91 153.31 Low
Apple 5b:81:a1 126.75 Low
Apple a5:db:34 119.16 Low
Access Point 854.78 Mid-High
Apple 4a:aa:13 1032.92 High
Apple 3e:39:83 1754.51 High
To get this Average of Mean value, first traffic per
minute was calculated and its mean over a day is
calculated. Then an average of all the mean traffic
per minute per day day is taken. Average is over
120+ days
Laptop, Samsung TV and Raspberry Pi all have very low traffic on the wireless inter-
face. It is unknown what type of device is Apple 86:34:26; so it is difficult to draw a
conclusion as to why its traffic is low. The low traffic volume of the Laptop could be
because it might have been taken out everyday when the occupants leave home for
work and it is not used much when at home. Or it could simply be out of range from
the point of data capture. Both the Samsung TV and the Raspberry Pi device are
not very active over the wireless network. That’s why their wireless traffic volume is
low. They must be very much active over the wired interface; let us verify that in
the coming sections. The Nest Thermostats all have a similar traffic volume and it
is quite low. Considering results from above, it is merely sending power management
information over the wireless interface. Devices Apple 0c:59:e5 and Apple 61:b1:70
also have a low traffic volume. From the information above, even these devices trans-
mit only power management frames over the wireless interface. Since they transmit
only NULL frames and the traffic volume is very low, it means they send fewer NULL
frames; meaning they stay in any state for longer duration. This is in par with our
observation from Table 5.9 on page 35 for device Apple 61:b1:70. Nintendo device
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has a high traffic; since it is a gaming console it is reasonable that it has a mid-range
high traffic. Apple TV and device Apple de:65:91 also have a high traffic and from
previous section we know that these devices sent only subtype 36 packets. This means
they sent high amounts of NULL frames. This aligns with our observation that these
devices toggle very frequently between the two states without doing anything else
on the wireless interface. The Router (Access Point) has the highest traffic among
all the devices. This is expected because every device on the wireless interface has
to communicate via the router; this is also verified from the previous section where
more than 99% of the time, the Access Point sends subtype 32 packets (Data packets),
proving that it is relaying the traffic between the various devices under it.
Table 5.16 on page 48 shows the traffic volume data of devices from network ’Host-
NetworkGuest’. Raspberry Pi has the lowest traffic among all the devices. This could
be because the device is sending all of its collected data over the wired interface; hence
its traffic on the wireless interface is very low. All the 3 Apple devices, Apple e8:26:91,
Apple 5b:81:a1 and Apple a5:db:34 have very low traffic. This leads to the conclu-
sion that they are either not active over the wireless interface and using the wired
interface for all their activities or they are devices with low traffic in general. The
Access Point has a mid-range traffic. This is justified because the number of devices
under it are so few in number and their respective traffic are not very high either.
Devices Apple 4a:aa:13 and Apple 3e:39:83 have traffic higher than the Router (AP)
because these devices also join networks ’TC8717TA5’ and another unknown network
respectively and this traffic is the total traffic of the device from all the networks.
But a higher traffic indicates that they are most likely non-IoT conventional devices
like smartphones or laptops.
From table 5.17 on page 50, we come to information about the traffic volume of
devices present under networks that are foreign to the location of the data capture.
Most of these devices are Access Points (Routers in a home environment) but still
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we find that their traffic volume is quite low; since the location of data capture is an
individual home, the location of these Access Points (and in turn the houses they are
present) would be quite far from our location and hence only very minimal packets
from those networks were captured in monitor mode.
Table 5.17: Location A - Outside Networks - Mean of Aver-
age Traffic generated in a minute over all days
Network Device
Avg. of
Mean(Bytes)
Traffic
Category
TC8717TA5 Apple e1:32:01 63.0 Very Low
161 AP (Z-Com a2:a9:34) 97.55 Very Low
TC8717TA5 AP (Technico 07:d7:ab) 107.87 Low
166 AP (Advantec f5:d3:ce) 284.0 Low
flynn Ext AP (BelkinIn a4:a2:fe) 162.83 Low
Hightower Power-1 AP (HonHaiPr da:c3:73) 286.95 Low
TC8717TA5 Apple 39:19:61 421.78 Low
165 AP (Advantec f5:cf:a4) 304.0 Low
167 AP (Advantec f5:d3:a0) 214.66 Low
TC8717TA5 Apple 13:40:f3 592.66 Mid-High
WIFIFC3D5E AP(HonHaiPr fc:3d:62) 607.13 Mid-High
To get this Average of Mean value, first traffic per minute was calculated and its
mean over a day is calculated. Then an average of all the mean traffic per minute
per day day is taken. Average is over 120+ days
Though at this point, the traffic volume of the devices is not as high as what we
would observe when capturing the packets from inside the network, still the differences
in traffic between the devices at this point would help us in identifying the devices.
Hence, just by passively capturing packets that are in the vicinity without even
joining the network and taking the Packet Length information available, an intruder
can easily calculate the total traffic associated with every device. With that infor-
mation he can very well identify IoT devices. Those would be the devices with a
significantly lower traffic volume when compared to the rest of the devices as they
will be performing only the task they are dedicated for.
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5.7.3 Do Devices consistently send the same amount of traffic everyday?
The traffic volume of a device varies with usage. This usage is influenced by the
purpose of the device or the user or even the environment. For example, a Smart TV’s
traffic volume would be directly proportional to the hours of watching TV (influenced
by the user) as well the type of content streamed (poor quality, HD, Ultra HD or even
mp3 etc.,). A smart light bulb’s traffic, similarly, depends on the hours of usage i.e.,
directly proportional to the amount of time people are present in the vicinity. For
any device, measuring the fluctuations in this traffic volume gives us insight into the
type of device. Non-IoT devices, in general, have more fluctuations in their traffic
volume; because they are used for a number purposes and their traffic volume could
vary based on a lot of factors. For example, we saw earlier how the traffic volume of
Smart TVs can vary according to the content streamed; it could also very depending
on the time and season; people are more likely to watch more TV in the weekends
and in the evenings and also during major events like national/world tournaments of
popular sports etc., A laptop could be used heavily for a day to browse contents from
the Internet, access cloud based applications etc., and not used at all on another day.
But IoT devices tend to have less variations in the traffic unless there is a radical
change in the environment. Example, the smart light bulb would have more or less
similar volumes of traffic unless the occupants are out of the house for a very long
period (vacationing for example), making the light bulb to lapse into a sleep mode
for longer duration. A Nest Thermostat would always be functioning and collecting
data about its surrounding unless the winter is over and it is switched off. Hence,
non-IoT devices, because their usages vary largely by purpose, have traffic that is
highly fluctuating whereas IoT devices, often dedicated to a single task, have traffic
that is quite constant unless there is a radical change in their environment.
51
Hence, we are going to find out how much the traffic volume of various devices
present under different networks vary over a period of the days we collected the data
and try to get insights into the type of device they are.
In order to also classify and group the devices based on their rate of traffic fluc-
tuation, we would take the standard deviation values of their mean traffic and assign
categories based on the SD. Table 5.18 on page 52 shows the standard deviation ranges
of the traffic volume (in Bytes) and the fluctuation categories assigned to them. The
lower a Standard Deviation value, the lesser the fluctuation of Traffic Volume over
the the days.
Table 5.18: Standard Deviation Limits for Traffic Fluctuation Category
STDEV Range
Fluctuation
Category
STDEV Range
Fluctuation
Category
STDEV Range
Fluctuation
Category
0 Level 0 1001 - 1500 Level 11 I 6001 - 6500 Level 16 I
1 - 100 Level 1 1501 - 2000 Level 11 II 6501 - 7000 Level 16 II
101 - 200 Level 2 2001 - 2500 Level 12 I 7001 - 7500 Level 17 I
201 - 300 Level 3 2501 - 3000 Level 12 II 7501 - 8000 Level 17 II
301 - 400 Level 4 3001 - 3500 Level 13 I 8001 - 8500 Level 18 I
401 - 500 Level 5 3501 - 4000 Level 13 II 8501 - 9000 Level 18 II
501 - 600 Level 6 4001 - 4500 Level 14 I 9001 - 9500 Level 19 I
601 - 700 Level 7 4501 - 5000 Level 14 II 9501 - 10000 Level 19 II
701 - 800 Level 8 5001 - 5500 Level 15 I 10001 and above Level 20
801 - 900 Level 9 5501 - 6000 Level 15 II
901 - 1000 Level 10
Lower Standard Deviation Values have lower Level numbers. Hence, the smaller the Level number, the lesser
the fluctuation in Traffic.
Table 5.19 on page 53 shows the traffic fluctuation categorization of devices present
under network ’HostNetwork’. Figure 5.6 on page 53 shows the same data in a clear
graph. The laptop, device Apple 86:34:26, Samsung TV and Raspberry Pi all have low
traffic fluctuations. As we discussed earlier, these devices must be active on the wired
interface and use the wireless interface just to send power management information.
Hence their traffic as well the fluctuation is low. Nintendo fa:9d:30 (which is also
present under the ’HostNetworkGuest’ sometimes) has a higher traffic but very low
fluctuation; and from previous section, we know that its traffic is purely data traffic.
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Table 5.19: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Fluctuations in Traffic over all
days
Device
Avg. of
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Variance
Fluctuation
Category
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 55.93 17.14 395.52 Level 1
Apple 86:34:26 62.4 26.24 903.4 Level 1
Samsung TV 63.43 27.26 1014.32 Level 1
Raspberry Pi 90.18 35.68 1939.18 Level 1
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 1231.17 104.2 33095.44 Level 2
NestLabs Thermostat (12:05:00) 303.89 199.59 50260.36 Level 2 (Borderline)
NestLabs Thermostat (13:7a:55) 313.47 191.61 47110.96 Level 2
NestLabs Thermostat (14:48:4b) 323.65 187.32 39706.63 Level 2
NestLabs Thermostat (14:58:68) 336.58 191.29 41726.27 Level 2
NestLabs Thermostat (15:3c:6e) 330.45 187.5 40427.83 Level 2
NestLabs Thermostat (2b:2b:61) 326.54 190.12 41903.13 Level 2
Apple 0c:59:e5 171.5 213.34 46197.25 Level 3
Apple c7:eb:05 569.63 641.25 710998.51 Level 6
Apple 61:b1:70 366.19 699.0 1230844.44 Level 7 (Borderline)
Apple 15:b9:21 627.2 797.93 943990.0 Level 8
Roku AP 918.39 835.4 1025965.0 Level 9
Apple TV 1769.52 840.02 844540.0 Level 9
Apple 0f:fd:22 792.37 1316.39 2991537.5 Level 11 I
Nintendo (09:28:c7) 641.01 1023.49 1100150.0 Level 11 I
Roku (a4:6d:16) 924.62 1049.94 2364625.0 Level 11 I
Apple de:65:91 4927.26 10607.8 147234146.34 Level 20
AP 17442.26 13325.16 226454032.26 Level 20
Figure 5.6: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Fluctuations in Traffic
Hence this device was used a lot consistently over the days. All the Nest Thermostat
devices have very low traffic fluctuation. This is quite reasonable and in par with
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Table 5.20: Location A - Network ’HostNetworkGuest’ - Fluctuations in Traffic over
all days
Device
Avg. of
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Variance
Fluctuation
Category
Raspberry Pi 80.73 39.14 1705.89 Level 1
Apple a5:db:34 119.16 60.08 8407.94 Level 1
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 1231.17 104.2 33095.44 Level 2
Apple e8:26:91 153.31 134.51 49975.0 Level 2
Apple 5b:81:a1 126.75 110.16 17438.0 Level 2
Apple 4a:aa:13 1032.92 784.83 2775038.46 Level 8
AP 854.78 1772.88 7743016.13 Level 11 II
Apple 3e:39:83 1754.51 4223.03 38156666.67 Level 14 I
our previous observation; they periodically send only power management information
to the AP over the wireless interface and there is no remarkable fluctuation in the
rate at which they change states, hence not much of a fluctuation in their power
management traffic either. Devices Apple 0c:59:e5, Apple c7:eb:05, Apple 61:b1:70
and Apple 15:b9:21 all have higher levels of traffic fluctuation than the Nest devices,
Pi etc., This leads to the conclusion that these are non-IoT devices whose traffic is
typical of devices that are used for a variety of purposes that incur a high traffic.
Apple TV has a higher traffic fluctuation. Since it sends only power management
data, this leads to the conclusion that it stays in Active and Sleep states for varying
periods of time and its traffic fluctuates according to the duration of its stay in any
one state; the lesser the duration, the higher will be the traffic as it will intimate the
AP every time it goes to Sleep mode and comes into Active mode and so will be the
vice versa - the longer the duration, the lower will be the traffic as the messages to
the AP will now be spaced in time a lot longer. Nintendo 09:28:c7 has lower traffic
than the other Nintendo device and its fluctuation is also higher; this means that
it was used only a few times with varying degrees of usage. The Roku device has
a higher fluctuation than that of the Roku AP and its traffic is also mostly power
management information. This could be because the Roku receives its streaming data
from the AP over the wired interface. Device Apple de:65:91 has a very high traffic
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and highly fluctuating too. Since we know all of its traffic on the wireless interface
is power management data, we confirm that it keeps toggling between the Sleep and
Active states over the wireless interface, which results in this high traffic. Also the
fluctuation in traffic is consistent with the results from Figure 5.3 which shows that
the frequency with which it toggles varies largely. Lastly, we see that the AP has the
highest fluctuating traffic among all the devices; also we know that its traffic is more
than 90% data traffic. This is reasonable as all the devices active over the wireless
interface would communicate via the AP (the router in a home environment) and the
traffic volume of the AP varies largely as devices come and leave the network, send
and receive different amounts of traffic according to their purpose etc.,
Table 5.20 on page 54 shows the traffic fluctuation categorization of various devices
present under network ’HostNetworkGuest’. The Raspberry Pi device has the lowest
level of traffic fluctuation; this is due to the fact that it transmits all of its collected
data over the wired interface and just sends power management information over the
wireless interface. Device Apple a5:db:34 has very low traffic and fluctuation level.
But not much can be said about it as only very minimal data was collected from it.
But since the traffic is very low, it is either a non-IoT device that is a little out of
the capture range of the Raspberry Pi device or it is an IoT device with very low
traffic in general. Device Apple 4a:aa:13 is definitely a non-IoT device as its traffic
is quite high and so is its fluctuation level; only devices that are used for various
purposes could have this level of traffic volume fluctuation. Devices Apple e8:26:91
and Apple 5b:81:a1 have fluctuation levels higher than the Nintendo device but lower
than the AP. The Access Point has very high levels of traffic fluctuation; because, as
said before, it relays the communication between the various devices and its traffic
volume is greatly influenced by the number and type of devices present under its
network at any instance.
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Table 5.21 on page 56 shows the information about various devices present under
networks that are foreign to the location of the data capture. Most of the devices are
Access Points; but still we that their fluctuation categories vary greatly; this is because
these APs are present at different distances from the point of data capture and the
data captured from them vary greatly in amount. Hence, this data is not perfectly
reflective of the type of devices; it is affected by the amount of data captured from
them. But we see that some other Apple and Motorola devices have higher volumes of
traffic and higher traffic fluctuation which leads to the conclusion that they must be
non-IoT devices. Devices 82:e2:f7:a6:0d:bc and Apple 0e:38:9c have very high levels
of traffic and fluctuation; they are definitely non-IoT devices.
Table 5.21: Location A - Other Networks - Fluctuations in Traffic over all days
Network Device
Avg. of
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Variance
Fluctuation
Category
TC8717TA5 Apple e1:32:01 63.0 0.0 0.0 Level 0
Unknown Network 4 Motorola 1d:d1:10 686.0 0.0 0.0 Level 0
161 AP (Z-Com a2:a9:34) 97.55 2.94 24.75 Level 1
TC8717TA5 AP(Technico 07:d7:ab) 107.87 52.2 104967.68 Level 1
166 AP (Advantec f5:d3:ce) 284.0 31.11 3872.0 Level 1
165 AP (Advantec f5:cf:a4) 304.0 81.46 19097.6 Level 1
Unknown Network 6 Apple ea:04:04 526.0 70.78 18228.0 Level 1
Unknown Network 16 AP (SenaoNet 11:c4:ee) 1848.3 102.49 73779.25 Level 2
flynn Ext AP (BelkinIn a4:a2:fe) 162.83 114.73 41378.4 Level 2
167 AP (Advantec f5:d3:a0) 214.66 129.97 20746.65 Level 2
Hightower Power-1 AP (HonHaiPr da:c3:73) 286.95 233.75 67532.67 Level 3
Unknown Network 8 6a:31:96:8c:d9:fc 1051.75 254.91 129960.0 Level 3
Unknown Network 15 SamsungE c8:4a:85 6965.35 383.8 294598.0 Level 4
WIFIFC3D5E AP (HonHaiPr fc:3d:62) 607.13 555.54 822900.0 Level 6
TC8717TA5 Apple 39:19:61 421.78 673.02 2720505.26 Level 7
TC8717TA5 Apple 13:40:f3 592.66 710.99 542822.0 Level 8
Unknown Network 6 Apple a4:11:69 2482.2 700.64 3522120.0 Level 8 (Borderline)
Unknown Network 4 Motorola fa:89:3e 2337.51 2140.22 48145555.56 Level 12 I
Unknown Network 8 82:e2:f7:a6:0d:bc 4471.72 2466.7 6262140.0 Level 12 I
Unknown Network 6 Apple 0e:38:9c 3462.67 3737.3 24064096.0 Level 13 II
5.7.4 Do Devices only send data or receive data or both ?
Traffic Direction can be of two types - Incoming and Outgoing; Incoming traffic
is the traffic that a device receives and Outgoing traffic is a traffic that the device
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sends out. Observing the traffic direction that a device gets involved in will us a lot
about the type of type and would help us differentiate IoT devices from the non-IoT
ones. IoT devices are designed to primarily collect data about their surroundings via
the in-built sensors and send the collected data to an outside server that is usually
dedicated for receiving the data from the devices of a particular vendor. For this
purpose, they use the Internet; to send the data to the outside servers. In return,
they do not receive much. The data they sent is processed on the servers for insights
about the environment and sometimes, instructions are sent back to the IoT device
from the server when some action has to be taken by the device. Hence, they send out
so much traffic but in return receive only less traffic. Non-IoT devices will not follow
this trend. Depending on what they do, they would either send and receive equal
amounts of traffic (not necessarily at the same time) and sometimes even receive more
than what they send out. For example, a Laptop would receive more traffic than it
is transmitting when a movie is being streamed; but it would be sending more traffic
than it is receiving when a huge file is being uploaded to the cloud. A smart TV
would almost always be receiving a lot of traffic than it is sending since its primary
purpose is to stream media content from the Internet.
Hence just by observing the traffic from outside the network without joining it
and by looking at the direction of traffic associated with each device, an intruder
can easily differentiate IoT devices from non-IoT ones. Devices with predominantly
outgoing traffic would be IoT devices. Devices with more or less equal outgoing
and incoming traffic would be laptops, mobile phones or even routers (which can be
further identified as ones with very high amounts of incoming and outgoing traffic
compared to the rest of the devices in the network). Devices with consistently high
incoming traffic would be streaming devices like Smart TVs, Roku etc.,
Table 5.22 on page 58 shows the percentage of days (over all 120+ days) where the
traffic is classified based on the direction into 3 different categories - Both In and Out
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Table 5.22: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Classification based
on Traffic Direction : Both In and Out, Only Out and Only In
Device
Both In
and Out(%)
Only
Out(%)
Only
In(%)
Direction
Category
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
NestLabs Thermostat (13:7a:55) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
NestLabs Thermostat (14:48:4b) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
NestLabs Thermostat (14:58:68) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
NestLabs Thermostat (15:3c:6e) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
NestLabs Thermostat (2b:2b:61) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple 0c:59:e5 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple 61:b1:70 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple TV 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Roku 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple 15:b9:21 33.33 66.67 0.0 Only Out > Mixed
Samsung TV 1.28 98.72 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Apple c7:eb:05 1.49 98.51 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 11.11 88.89 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Apple 0f:fd:22 12.5 87.5 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
AP 73.17 26.83 0.0 Mixed  Only Out
Laptop (1c:ce:2) 80.0 20.0 0.0 Mixed  Only Out
Apple 86:34:26 87.27 12.73 0.0 Mixed  Only Out
Raspberry Pi 72.41 27.59 0.0 Mixed  Only Out
Nintendo (09:28:c7) 100.0 0.0 0.0 Exclusively Mixed
Table 5.23: Location A - Network ’HostNetworkGuest’ - Clas-
sification based on Traffic Direction : Both In and Out, Only
Out and Only In
Device
Both In
and Out(%)
Only
Out(%)
Only
In(%)
Direction
Category
Apple a5:db:34 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple e8:26:91 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple 4a:aa:13 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Apple 3e:39:83 37.33 62.67 0.0 Only Out > Mixed
Apple 5b:81:a1 27.27 72.73 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 11.11 88.89 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
AP 67.48 32.52 0.0 Mixed > Only Out
Raspberry Pi 100.0 0.0 0.0 Exclusively Mixed
(when a device participates in sending as well as receiving traffic over the entire day),
Only Out (when a device only sends the data over an entire day) and Only In (when a
device only receives data over an entire day). We see that the Nest Thermostat devices
only Send Out the data. They do not receive anything on the wireless interface; they
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send out the power management information. To get the information about the true
traffic of the Nest Devices, we should look into their traffic over the wired interface.
Other devices that are expected to receive more traffic than they send out like Apple
TV, Samsung TV, Roku etc., also have either exclusively outgoing traffic or the
days where they have mixed traffic is negligible when compared to the days when
they have exclusively Out traffic; this could be the result of the devices being using
the wired interface for all their streaming activities (which would reflect their true
traffic direction) and using the wireless interface for just sending power management
information. Of the two Nintendo devices, device Nintendo fa:9d:30 has exclusively
outgoing traffic for most of the days whereas Nintendo 09:28:c7 sends and receives
traffic on all the days that the data was captured. From previous sections, we know
that this traffic is purely data traffic. But as to why one device behaves differently
from the other, we have to know exactly what is being sent by Nintendo fa:9d:30; we
would get that information only when we observe the traffic from inside the network.
The AP as expected, spends most of the days sending and receiving the traffic; it
would be relaying data between the devices to enable them to communicate. The
Raspberry Pi device has predominantly mixed traffic and on some days exclusively
Outgoing traffic. The outgoing traffic is definitely the power management information
on the wireless interface.
Table 5.23 on page 58 shows the traffic direction information for the devices present
under network ’HostNetworkGuest’. Devices Apple a5:db:34, Apple e8:26:91 and Ap-
ple 4a:aa:13 all have exclusively outgoing traffic; device Apple 3e:39:83 has mostly
outgoing traffic with some days having mixed traffic. We know that their traffic is
purely power management information and no data. Either the devices are inactive
over the wireless interface or they do not do anything else at all. The Raspberry Pi
device sends as well as receives traffic on all days; from previous analysis, this traffic
is exclusively type 36 packets.
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Table 5.24 on page 60 shows the data about the traffic direction of the various
devices present under different networks in the vicinity. We see that all of the APs
except Technico 07:d7:ab have exclusively outgoing traffic. We saw earlier that most
of the time, their traffic was purely data (Subtype 32). The absence of incoming traffic
could be because the devices under these APs could be so far away from the point of
observation that we were not able to capture them; but the AP’s transmission range
boundary could overlap with our range of data capture that we were able to capture
the packets transmitted from those APs. AP Technico 07:d7:ab is the only exception
as we have managed to captured both incoming as well as outgoing traffic from it; so
it quite nearer compared to other APs. That is why we are able to see more number
of devices from network ’TC8717TA5’ (to which the AP belongs to) than the other
networks.
Table 5.24: Location A - Other Networks - Classification based on Traffic Direction
: Both In and Out, Only Out and Only In
Network Device
Both In
and Out(%)
Only
Out(%)
Only
In(%)
Direction
Category
TC8717TA5 Apple e1:32:01 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 4 Motorola 1d:d1:10 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
161 AP (Z-Com a2:a9:34) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
166 AP (Advantec f5:d3:ce) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
165 AP (Advantec f5:cf:a4) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 6 Apple ea:04:04 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 16 AP (SenaoNet 11:c4:ee) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
flynn Ext AP (BelkinIn a4:a2:fe) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
167 AP (Advantec f5:d3:a0) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Hightower Power-1 AP (HonHaiPr da:c3:73) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 8 6a:31:96:8c:d9:fc 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 15 SamsungE c8:4a:85 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
WIFIFC3D5E AP (HonHaiPr fc:3d:62) 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
TC8717TA5 Apple 39:19:61 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
TC8717TA5 Apple 13:40:f3 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 6 Apple a4:11:69 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 4 Motorola fa:89:3e 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 8 82:e2:f7:a6:0d:bc 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
Unknown Network 6 Apple 0e:38:9c 0.0 100.0 0.0 Exclusively Out
TC8717TA5 AP (Technico 07:d7:ab) 50.98 46.08 2.94 Mixed ≈ Only Out
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5.8 Conclusion
Hence, by just observing the packets from outside the network passively and ex-
amining the traffic direction of devices, an intruder can guess the type of device simply
by resolving the OUI present in the first half of the MAC address. This would nar-
row down the list of what type of device it could possibly be. And from the Beacon
frames he can get the list of nearby network names and their Access Point addresses.
From the data packets, analyzing the 4 different address fields and the DS flag under
Frame Control would give him the list of APs and the devices under it. Combining
both the lists, he can figure out which devices belong to what network. And from the
signal strength information, he can figure out which network belongs to which house.
Hence effectively, just from this superficial information, one can figure out exactly
the number and to a greater degree, the type of devices that are present in a house.
And from further analyzing the data, he can clearly differentiate an IoT device from
a non-IoT device by looking at how active a device is and how often does it go to
sleep. IoT devices would not be as active as a non-IoT device and they would stay
in sleep state for a longer duration consistently so as to save battery. This is verified
by the results we got from our analysis. By analyzing the traffic volume associated
with a device and the various other parameters like the what type of packets they
send, their traffic volume, how consistently do they send the same volume of traffic,
whether they only send or receive packets or both and to what percentage - all this
would give him sufficiently clear results to differentiate the various devices present
inside the network. By combining results of all the parameters for each device, he
would be able to create a profile for each device. Since he would already know the
type of device from the OUI data, he can associate that profile with the exact kind
of device. This composed profile would be a good way to identify similar devices (or
even exactly the device) when presented with a new set of devices.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS OF DATA CAPTURED FROM INSIDE THE
NETWORK
The previous chapter dealt with what an intruder could learn just by passively
observing the traffic of the network from a distance without even joining the network.
Though we were able to learn about how IoT and non-IoT devices differ in their
behaviour under various parameters, we were not able to learn exactly what activity
these devices are involved in. But now, since we are going to observe the traffic from
inside the network, it would give us a much more detailed insight about the activities
of the devices.
From this internal traffic, we would try to identify IoT devices and differentiate
how they vary in their behaviour from conventional non-IoT devices. Since we are
inside the network, we would be able to see almost all the traffic that is exchanged
within the network (sometimes we may lose some packets if the network is too large
for the capturing device to cover) and that would give us much more information to
go on about our analysis than the information we got from observing the traffic from
outside. Hence, before classifying these devices on the parameters that we already
employed in the previous section like Traffic Volume, Traffic Direction etc., we would
try to analyze the information that is exclusively available only at this point, i.e.,
from inside the network.
6.1 Data Encapsulation
In Table 5.1 on page 18, we saw the fields present in IEEE 802.11 header, which is
the encapsulation employed when a packet leaves the AP. Inside the network, IEEE
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802.3(Ethernet) header is used. Generally, all wireless packets use 802.11 header and
all wireless nodes send Data, Management and Control frames. But traditional OSes
do not know how to interpret this header; they can only interpret 802.3 header. So
the NIC converts the 802.11 header into 802.3 header before passing it up to the OS.
Hence , the OS always sees only the 802.3 header.
Table 6.1 on page 63 shows a subset of the various fields present in IEEE 802.3
header. This is the header that visible at the OS for all devices present in wired as
well as wireless medium.
Table 6.1: A subset of fields present in the IEEE 802.3 Header
Layer Field Name Description
Frame *
frame.time Timestamp of the packet capture
frame.interface name The interface on which the packet was captured
frame.length Packet Length
frame.time delta Time elapsed after the capture of the previous packet
frame.protocols Protocols present in the packet
Ethernet
eth.type
Type of Ethernet frame;
value varies depending on the higher layer protocol
eth.src Source MAC address
eth.dst Destination MAC address
eth.ig
Individual or Group address;
0 indicates unicast, 1 indicates multicast or broadcast address
eth.lg
Local or Global address;
0 indicates Vendor given, 1 indicates local;
Generally vendor given addresses are not changed
but may be changed for administrative purposes
Network
ip.src Source IP address
ip.dst Destination IP address
ip.id
Identification; for identifying the frames
in case there is fragmentation
ip.ttl Time to Live
ip.geoip.src asnum Source Autonomous System number
ip.geoip.dst asnum Destination Autonomous System number
Transport
tcp.srcport TCP Source Port
tcp.dstport TCP Destination Port
tcp.flags.syn TCP SYN Flag
tcp.flags.ack TCP ACK Flag
tcp.flags.fin TCP FIN Flag
udp.srcport UDP Source Port
udp.dstport UDP Destination Port
Frame fields are captured information provided by tshark and is not an OSI Layer
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Using the information obtained from this header, we would like to learn about
the activities of each device and gain meaningful insights about the devices. This
information (except the MAC address) is available only inside the network and is not
visible from outside the network.
6.2 Network Protocols used by a Device
Network Protocols can be defined as rules that are practised by all the devices
present in the network in order to facilitate communication with each other as well as
to transport packets from the source to their intended destination. Different protocols
are defined on different layers of the OSI model to carry out the various functions
defined for that layer. For example, TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is the
most commonly used protocol on the Transport Layer for reliable communication;
FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is used for transferring files across clients in the network
and it acts on the Application Layer; ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) is used for
resolving IP addresses into MAC addresses when devices in LAN want to communicate
and it acts on the Media Access Control Layer. These are a few examples of the
various protocols operating in different layers on the OSI model.
Hence by learning what protocols are used by various devices, we would be able
to say what exactly these devices are doing. Also, the number of protocols employed
by each device must also differentiate IoT and non-IoT devices. As discussed before,
since IoT devices perform a single or a very few closely related tasks, the number of
protocols used by them must be much lower than the non-IoT devices like laptops,
smart phones etc., since they perform a variety of tasks and would be using a variety
of protocols to fulfill them.
Since devices are connected to the network either via the wired interface or the
wireless interface or some times both, we would analyze the protocols used by the
devices on both the media.
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6.2.1 Wired Medium
Table 6.2: Location A - Network ’HostNetwork’ - Protocols used by devices on Wired
Medium while Transmitting
Device Protocols Used Count
Egauge (00:00:b8) igmp,ip, 2
ObihaiTe (62:e9:8e) arp,ip, 2
Egauge (00:04:a4) igmp,ip, 2
Laptop (47:d9:d9) arp,ip,llc, 3
MacMini (ba:b3:d6) arp,ip,ipv6, 3
Apple ea:b3:5e llc,vssmonitoring,wlccp, 3
Nintendo (09:28:c7) arp,bootp,llc, 3
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) arp,bootp,ip,llc, 4
Azurewav 37:19:02 arp,ip,ipv6,llc, 4
Insteon Hub (46:fa:a7) arp,bootp,data,ip, 4
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) bootp,icmpv6,igmp,llc,mdns, 5
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) arp,bootp,ip,llc,ssdp, 5
Dryer (34:3d:61) arp,bootp,ip,llc,ssdp, 5
Raspberry Pi 1 (35:bb:d5) bootp,icmpv6,igmp,llc,mdns,vlan, 6
Roku (72:1a:5d) arp,bootp,data,igmp,ip,llc,ssdp, 7
NestLabs (12:05:00) arp,bootp,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,mdns, 9
NestLabs (13:7a:55) arp,bootp,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,mdns, 9
NestLabs (14:48:4b) arp,bootp,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,mdns, 9
NestLabs (14:58:68) arp,bootp,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,mdns, 9
Tp-LinkT 49:07:24 arp,ath,bootp,data,igmp,ip,ipv6,kink,llc,manolito,pn io, 11
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) arp,bootp,data,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,mdns,tcp,wlccp, 12
Mac Mini (aa:8d:ef) arp,bootp,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,mdns,nbdgm,nbns,ssdp, 12
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) arp,bootp,dns,http,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,ntp,Protocol,ssh,tcp, 12
Laptop (1c:ce:28)
arp,bootp,data,db-lsp-disc,igmp,ip,llc,mdns,nbdgm,
nbns,ssdp,vssmonitoring,wlccp
13
Printer (08:bf:14)
arp,bootp,data,dhcpv6,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,
llmnr,mdns,nbns,srvloc
13
Apple de:65:91
arp,bootp,data,dhcpv6,esp,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,llc,
mdns,ssdp,vssmonitoring,wlccp
14
Router (e5:a8:02)
afp,arp,bootp,data,dns,fb zero,
gryphon,http,icmpv6,ip,ipv6,isakmp,mdns,
nbdgm,ntp,portcontrol,ssh,ssl,tcp,wol
20
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a)
arp,ath,bootp,data,dhcpv6,elasticsearch,
enip,hcrt,icmpv6,igmp,ip,ipv6,kink,
llc,manolito,pn io,ssdp,tc nv,tcp,tzsp
20
Table 6.2 on page 65 shows the protocols used by various devices on the wired
medium while transmitting. At the outset, we can clearly see the difference in the
number of protocols employed by various devices. Devices like Egauge, Insteon Hub,
washing machine and dryer, Nest Thermostat devices employ a lesser number of
protocols when compared to devices like Samsung TV, Router, Laptop, Apple TV
etc., This clearly illustrates the difference in the nature of the two types of devices. IoT
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devices, since they perform a minimum number of tasks employ a minimum numbers
of protocols to do just that whereas devices like Laptop, Routers, Smart TVs etc., are
used to perform a much wider array of tasks and the variety of protocols employed
by them reflect that.
Egauge devices consistently use protocol IGMP. IGMP (Internet Group Manage-
ment Protocol) is used by hosts and multicast-enabled routers to perform multicast
communication. Multicast is different from broadcast in that a broadcast packet
reaches every host in the LAN whereas a multicast packet reaches only hosts present
in the multicast group. In order to maintain the group, multicast routers send gen-
eral and group specific queries to maintain the group status and reception status of
hosts respectively. Hosts wishing to remain in the multicast group must reply to this
as a ’Membership Report’. Egauge is doing that by periodically sending member-
ship report packets to remain in the group. Here it reports to be present in group
’224.0.0.251’ which is the multicast IP of MDNS. Device Egauge 00:27:cc is involved
in ARP, IGMP, and MDNS. ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) is used when a de-
vice wants to know the MAC address of the device which has a particular IP. Here it
asks for MAC address of 10.0.1.1 which is the default gateway in many home network
settings. It also sent MDNS packets. MDNS (Multicast DNS) is used for resolving
host addresses when a local name server is absent (which is usually the router). The
host sends an MDNS query asking the host with the domain name to identify itself;
the host concerned replies back to the same multicast IP with its IP in the reply as
its source. This reply is received by all in the multicast group and they update their
DNS cache.
We see all the Nest Thermostats employing the same protocols indicating the
uniformity in their behaviour. Periodically they sent ARP requests asking for 10.0.1.1
which is the default gateway. Bootp (Bootstrap) is a protocol that is used to assign IP
addresses automatically to devices that come online. The difference between Bootp
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and DHCP (Dynamic Host configuration protocol) is that bootp assigns a static
address and DHCP assigns an address dynamically from the pool of IP addresses
that are currently available. A bootp message is sent by a client to the server when it
boots up and needs an IP address. Otherwise bootp is not used. But DHCP is used
for on-demand IP address and it is compatible with bootp as well. Hence, generally
bootp is used in immobile devices. Therefore the presence of bootp indicates not
only that the device is stationary but the timestamp indicates the time when it was
booted as well. Of the 40 days’ data we used for analysis, Nest Devices used bootp
only exactly on 3 days - 15/Mar/2018, 31/May/2018 and 21/Jun/2018. These could
very well be the times these devices were booted or restarted. We also see that bootp
is used in devices like Samsung TV (which has sent the message almost daily - which
is very reasonable for a TV which would be switched off every time after use), Router
(e5:a8:02), Printer (08:bf:14) (which has sent the message only on 3 days - might be
connected online all the time to facilitate printing whenever needed), Mac Mini, Apple
TV (which also sent the message almost daily like Samsung TV), Washing Machine
(which sent the message only on 2 days), Dryer (sent bootp only on 1 day) which are
all stationary. But we do not see bootp messages in devices like Laptop (47:d9:d9),
Apple ea:b3:5e, Apple 0c:59:e5 etc., which are clearly mobile devices. But there are
some exceptions here: ObihaiTe (62:e9:8e), Mac Mini (ba:b3:d6) etc., are clearly
immobile. But we do not see any bootp messages associated with them. It could be
that in the time period of our observation, they did not boot up. Nest Devices also
employ ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) that is used for maintaining the
proper communication by enabling sending of error messages, facilitating managing
of multicast groups. They regularly send ICMPv6 (version 6) Router Solicitation
messages (Type 133), which are sent with an unspecified address (::) as the source
IP address till they get a valid IP address and once they get an IP, they send a
Multicast Listener Report (Type 143) Message with the assigned IP as the source.
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The number of ICMP messages vary greatly over the data collection period. During
the months of January and February, the number of ICMP messages are quite high
and they reduce gradually over the coming months. In the month of June, there is
an average of around 10 ICMP messages per day that shows reduced activity. This
is reasonable as the Thermostat would be quite active during winter months and not
so active during summer.
TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) is used to send data in a reliable manner
as acknowledgements are received for every packet that is sent. It is the most com-
monly used protocol for sending actual data across the network. UDP is generally
used when the data sent is short bursts of message that do not have to be tracked for
reliability. We see that TCP is employed by devices like Router (e5:a8:02), Raspberry
Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f), Samsung TV, Apple TV etc.,; Router and Raspberry Pi sending the
data that is being collected in the network to the remote server and both the Smart
TVs streaming content from the Internet. WLCCP (Wireless LAN Context Control
Protocol) is used in an environment where there are multiple APs to provide services
commonly called as WDS (Wireless Domain Services); WBS provides enhanced secu-
rity, scalable WLAN etc., This is implemented in Cisco Access Points. We see it in
Apple ea:b3:5e (which we clearly know to be an AP from previous sections) but not
in Router (e5:a8:02), which could mean that Apple ea:b3:5e is a Cisco AP. We see
the Printer (08:bf:14) uses protocol srvloc (Service Location). It is a service discovery
protocol used by devices to announce the services they provide over a local network
when they act as the Service Agents(SA). Devices wanting to use the service act as
User Agents (UA) and would always be listening on port 427. This protocol is typi-
cally used by devices like printers that are required to work on the network without
any prior configuration.
Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) is used by devices to advertise their
presence and their services. Devices that want to use the service discover the services
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using SSDP. It operates on port 1900 and is the basis of the Plug-and-Play protocol
that is commonly used. It is used in small networks and home environments without
the need for any configuration. Advertising devices use NOTIFY messages and devices
searching for services use M-SEARCH messages. Washing Machine and Dryer send
SSDP NOTIFY messages once or twice almost daily. Roku 72:1a:5d sends hundreds of
SSDP NOTIFY packets each day. Devices like Laptop (1c:ce:28), MacMini (aa:8d:ef),
and Apple 0f:fd:22 send M-SEARCH messages quite frequently throughout the day on
many days. The M-SEARCH message from these devices and the NOTIFY message
from Roku 72:1a:5d happen back and forth that it could only mean these devices are
streaming content from Roku.
NBDGM (NetBIOS Datagram Service) and NBNS (NetBIOS Name Service) are
used by some legacy systems (or Windows systems for name resolution when a DNS
is absent) that use NetBIOS API for file sharing and connecting with the printer
and enable them to communicate over the TCP/IP stack. NBNS acts over UDP
port 137 and is used for Name Services like registering a name, lookup for NetBIOS
name resolution (as each device has a NetBIOS name) etc., and NBDS acts over
UDP port 138 and is used for sending connectionless datagrams (meaning no previous
communication is necessary for sending packets) to other NetBIOS devices. From our
data, we see that these protocols are used by Printer (08:bf:14), MacMini (aa:8d:ef),
Laptop (1c:ce:28), Apple 86:34:26 and Router (e5:a8:02), probably for communicating
with the printer as we see NBDS (Datagram packets) originating from all the devices
except the Printer, meaning the Printer just receives content from all other NetBIOS
devices and just participates in NBNS (Name Resolution). We were also able to learn
their NetBIOS names - Router (e5:a8:02) : JEANNIES-AIRPOR, MacMini (aa:8d:ef)
: NetBIOs name MACMINI-BEE177, Laptop (1c:ce:28) : MACBOOKPRO-CE28,
Apple 86:34:26 : RUGGER9.
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6.2.2 Wireless Medium
Table 6.3: Location A - Protocols used by devices on Wireless Medium while Trans-
mitting
Device Protocols Used Device Protocols Used
Protocols Count Protocols Count
AP eapol 1 Washer arp, bootp, ssdp 3
Egauge b8 igmp 1 Apple 0f:fd:22
arp, bootp,
igmp, mdns
4
Egauge a4) igmp 1 Apple 15:b9:21
arp, bootp,
igmp, mdns
4
Mosberge 0a igmp 1 Ipad 38)
arp, bootp,
igmp, mdns
4
Nintendo 09 arp 1 Raspberry Pi b7
arp, bootp,
igmp, mdns
4
Ipad 0d arp, igmp 2 Ipad 3e)
arp, bootp, igmp,
mdns, raknet
5
Raspberry Pi 43 data, igmp 2 Apple TV
arp, bootp, icmpv6,
igmp, mdns
5
Nest Thermostat 12 arp, bootp 2 Apple 61:b1:70
arp, bootp, data,
igmp, mdns
5
Nest Thermostat 13 arp, bootp 2 Apple de:65:91
arp, bootp, icmpv6,
igmp, mdns
5
Nest Thermostat 14:48 arp, bootp 2 Printer
arp, bootp, icmpv6,
mdns, nbns
5
Nest Thermostat 14:58 arp, bootp 2 Laptop
arp, bootp, db-lsp-disc
igmp, mdns, nbns, smb
7
Nest Thermostat 15 arp, bootp 2 Apple 86:34:26
arp, bootp, icmpv6, igmp,
mdns, nbns, smb
7
Nest Thermostat 2b arp, bootp 2 MacMini aa
arp, bootp, icmpv6, igmp,
mdns, nbns, smb
7
Nintendo fa arp, bootp 2 Raspberry Pi 28
arp, bootp, eapol, icmpv6,
igmp, ssh, tcp
7
Roku 72 arp, bootp 2 Tp-LinkT
arp, ath, bootp, data,
igmp, kink,
manolito, pn io
8
Dryer arp, ssdp 2 Router
arp, bootp, data,
icmpv6, mdns,
portcontrol, smb,
ssh, tcp, wol
10
Egauge 27 arp, igmp, mdns 3 Samsung TV
arp, ath, bootp,
data, elasticsearch, hcrt,
igmp, kink, manolito,
pn io, tc nv
11
Insteon Hub arp, bootp, data 3
Table 6.3 on page 70 shows the protocols used by various devices connected on the
wireless medium. The number of protocols used by various devices clearly differentiate
IoT and non-IoT devices as before.
Over all, we can see that almost all of the devices employ lesser number of protocols
over the wireless medium than the wired medium. This indicates that they are more
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active over the wired interface. But regarding Nest Thermostats, we do not know if
that is case; the data collected on internal wireless medium is during the months of
June and July where as the data collected on internal wired stars from January. Since
it is winter during January and summer during June/July, the reduced activity of Nest
Thermostats could simply be because of the period of the data capture on internal
wireless. We see that both the Ipad devices Ipad (41:a9:38) and Ipad (41:a9:3e) use
protocol bootp. This is strange because, on the wired medium, only devices that
remained stationary were sending bootp messages. Even if we assume that bootp
messages are sent whenever the Ipad was bootup, the absence of dhcp is puzzling.
Because, in wired medium, even if latest devices like Samsung TV, Apple TV, Mac
Mini etc., did send bootp messages when they booted up, they also used dhcp which
is the protocol the more advanced devices use for procuring IP addresses. Analyzing
the timestamps when bootp was sent, we see that device Ipad (41:a9:38) booted up
more frequently (every 2-3 days, sometimes even frequently) than Ipad (41:a9:3e)
(mostly only once in a week or 10 days). This could either indicate that device Ipad
(41:a9:38) was used more frequently and hence switched off more frequently in need
of a recharge or that the two Ipads belong to 2 different people in the household and
one charges the device more diligently than the other. Also, one of the Ipad devices,
Ipad (41:a9:3e) uses protocol raknet on 3 days continuously 14th, 15th and 16th June,
2018. Raknet is a networking protocol developed by Oculus VR, Inc. On the first
day, raknet packets are transmitted for just 5 mins in the morning; on second day for
1 hour in the evening and on the third day for 20 mins in the morning. Hence, on
those 3 days, the Ipad device has connected with an Oculus device for the durations
mentioned. The rest of the devices employ only a subset of the protocols that they
used on the wired medium; this indicates reduced variety of activity over the wireless
medium.
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Hence, the number of protocols observed on the wireless medium, just like the
wired medium, clearly illustrates the difference between IoT and non-IoT devices. IoT
devices employ fewer number of protocols reflecting their narrow scope of activities
whereas non-IoT devices like Smart TVs, Router, TP Link, Mac Mini etc., use a
larger number of protocols indicating the wide variety of tasks they perform.
Thus by merely looking at the number of protocols employed a device, we can
clearly differentiate between IoT and non-IoT devices. IoT devices would be using
fewer protocols where as non-IoT devices, since they participate in a variety of tasks,
employ a larger number of protocols. Also, by examining what type of protocol
is used by each device, we can learn a lot about the characteristics of each device
including the type of activity each device gets involved in. Egauge devices participate
in multicast messaging. About the Nest Thermostats, we know that they participated
in multicast messaging groups, we know the exact timestamp of their boot up and
that they are stationary (by the use of bootp), and that their degree of activity has
reduced after the winter months of January and February. Raspberry Pi, Router and
Smart TVs are involved in content streaming which is verified by the presence of
TCP. Also, we have confirmed the presence of multiple APs in this single network by
the presence of protocol WLCCP which is typically used in a multiple AP network.
We know when devices like Laptop (1c:ce:28), MacMini (aa:8d:ef) etc., get connected
with Roku for streaming multimedia by observing SSDP packets. We also know
that the host network still has some devices that use the NetBIOS over TCP/IP for
communicating with other NetBIOS devices. NetBIOS is considered a high security
risk as it is vulnerable to ’pass the hash’ attack. Thus we were able to learn a lot of
information about each of the devices in the network by observing and analyzing the
protocols they use.
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6.3 Network Ports used for communication
Network ports can be seen as the starting and ending points for network commu-
nication. Any data that has to be sent originates from them, goes through all layers
of the Network on both the transmitter and receiver side and finally reaches the port
on the other end. On a system level, a port is the point or the logical identification
of the various processes that are participating in network communication. Some port
numbers are assigned for commonly used Internet tasks and they do not change. For
example, SSH always acts on port 22, HTTP always acts on port 80, DNS always
acts on port 53. Hence just by looking at the port numbers associated with a device,
one would be able to say what type of activities the device is involved in. Hence, this
would supplement the protocol data that we got from the previous section.
The ports can either act over TCP or UDP. TCP is used when the communication
is premeditated by both the sender and the receiver and requires that it has to be
reliable ie., loss of packets is not tolerable and packets have to be retransmitted if
lost. UDP is used when the sender wants to send traffic just like that to the receiver
without acknowledging the receiver first. It is used in tasks where a little loss of
packets is quite tolerable; lost packets are not retransmitted. For example, TCP is
used in sending email via SMTP; no part of the data must be lost; hence if a packet
gets lost, it is retransmitted to ensure all content is delivered. UDP, for example, is
often used in video streaming; no problem even if one or two packets are lost as the
frames will keep coming and the loss will not be noticeable; here retransmission of
packets will create unnecessary overhead. Hence analyzing how much of the traffic
sent by a device is TCP/UDP could also help us in understanding what the devices
do the devices better.
Table 6.4 on page 74 shows the various ports employed by the non-IoT devices like
Laptops, Smart TVs, Ipads etc., during transmission on the wired and the wireless
medium.
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Table 6.4: Location A - Network Ports Used by Non-IoT Devices while Transmitting
Device Wired Medium Wireless Medium
Source Port Percentage Source Port Percentage
Apple 0f:fd:22
68 0.73% 68 0.84%
5353 86.98% 5353 99.15%
Custom 12.29%
Apple c7:eb:05
68 68.06% 68 100%
4500 31.41%
Custom 0.52%
Apple de:65:91
68 0.55% 68 0.79%
4500 0.0029% 5353 99.20%
5353 94.81%
Custom 4.64%
Ipad (41:a9:3e)
68 0.065% 68 0.29%
5353 23.76% 5353 38.25%
Custom 76.18% Custom 61.46%
Laptop (1c:ce:28)
138 0.023% 138 0.032%
68 0.08% 68 0.096%
137 3.44% 137 4.56%
5353 4.52% 5353 11.57%
Custom 91.93% Custom 83.72%
Apple TV (50:6a:f1)
68 0.036% 68 0.0501%
5353 99.96% 5353 99.95%
7000 0.0004%
Custom 0.0096%
MacMini (aa:8d:ef)
68 0.94% 68 1.33%
137 39.76% 137 55.84%
138 0.038% 138 0.092%
5353 16.76% 5353 42.74%
Custom 42.49%
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a)
68 0.022% 68 0.12%
3942 0.18% Custom 99.88%
3955 7.81%
7678 0.001%
8001 53.94%
Router (e5:a8:02)
22 99.50% 22 98.061%
53 1.28% 67 0.038%
67 0.003% 138 0.095%
80 0.0039% 5351 0.00103%
138 0.016% 5353 1.80516%
443 0.011%
548 3.86%
4500 1.28%
5223 0.001%
5228 0.0005%
5351 0.0003%
5353 0.37%
8082 0.0005%
9543 0.078%
Printer (08:bf:14)
68 0.23% 68 0.219%
137 0.701% 137 0.622%
427 0.35% 5353 99.158%
3702 0.233645%
5353 98.1308%
Custom 0.350%
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6.3.1 Wired Medium
The ports used by the devices on the wired medium is reflective of the protocols
used by them which we saw in the previous section; devices differ in the number of
ports they use and their percentage. Let us take device Apple 0f:fd:22. It uses port 68
for transmission 0.73% of the time. Port 68 is the one used by bootp clients when they
bootup and want to send bootp packets to the server. The low percentage of bootp
indicates that it did not boot up often. This is verified by the fact that the protcol
was used by Apple 0f:fd:22 only on 5 days during the period of our data capture.
Hence, from the previous section, we knew that it sent bootp messages. This section
gives us quantitative information about it. Port 5353 is used for sending multicast
DNS messages. Multicast DNS is used when a true DNS cannot be implemented; for
example, small networks implement MDNS where each device functions as the MDNS
client as well the server, periodically multicasting their MDNS name, IP address, the
services they offer etc., Hence it is common for networks with devices participating
in MDNS to have high MDNS traffic. Apple 0f:fd:22 uses port 5353 for 86.98% of
the time. This being an Apple device, it is not purely MDNS traffic; the traffic is
created by ’Bonjour’, Apple’s application meant for zero configuration networking.
It is aimed at providing services like hostname resolution, address assignment and
service discovery etc., seamlessly with zero input from the user and it is implemented
over MDNS; that is why the high MDNS traffic. Apple 0f:fd:22 also uses some 12.29%
of custom ports. Custom ports are the ones that are out of the 0-1023 range which
are reserved for commonly employed tasks. For example, the applications running
in our laptops would use custom ports so as to not clash with the standard network
applications that would be running under the hood. The presence of custom ports
indicate that Apple 0f:fd:22 is running other custom applications.
Device Apple c7:eb:05 has used port 68 around 68% of the time, which is quite
high. From the data, we see that it has booted up almost daily during the period
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of our data collection; may be this is a device that is often restarted like a laptop.
Another reason this device might be a laptop is it uses port 4500, which is reserved
for IPSec NAT Traversal. From the protocol data, we also see that it uses protocol
’esp’ - Encapsulating Security Payload. This is used to keep the data secure by
encrypting everything from Transport Layer and above. Generally routers would
employ a technique called NAPT (Network Address Port Translation) to be able to
use a single routable IP address for all the devices inside the network. But this requires
a port number to uniquely identify each device. Since ESP encrypts everything from
the Transport Layer, a port is not available for NAPT. This is where NAT Traversal
comes in. It encapsulates the already encapsulated ESP packet with a UDP header
with source and destination ports as 4500 and now NAPT can function properly.
Since NAT-T is used, this is not VPN but just Transport Mode of IPSec. This
encryption is something only a laptop or a device with a higher resource would do.
Laptop (1c:ce:28) is involved in custom ports for more than 91.93%, meaning that
it is running a lot of custom applications (non-system applications). This proves
that it could only be a device like laptop or smart phone that is running various
applications. It uses port 138 which is reserved for NetBIOS Datagram service. This
is in accordance with our observation from the previous section and it is probably
used to send data to the printer. Apple de:65:91 is also involved in IPSec NAT
Traversal (port 4500) for a smaller percentage. Around 4.6% of its traffic is from
custom applications. The presence of traffic from port 5353 (Bonjour Application)
and 4500 (IPSec NAT-T) confirm that this is a non-IoT device and that too, an Apple
device. Apple TV’s traffic is also mostly from port 5353, which is from Bonjour acting
over MDNS. The presence of port 7000 indicates that Apple’s Quick Time Streaming
Server is running on this machine[36]. It is used for delivering media content like audio
and video over the Internet. Therefore, the presence of ports 5353 and 7000 indicate
that Apple TV (50:6a:f1) is an Apple device and port 7000 clearly indicates that it
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must be a streaming device like TV. MacMini (aa:8d:ef), being an Apple device uses
port 5353 for around 16% of the time. It also uses a high amount of custom ports -
42.49%. This indicates that it is running a lot of non-system applications and hence
it must be a device like laptop or desktop. It is also involved in NetBIOS operations
using ports 137 and 138, which are probably used for maintaining communication
with the printer and sending the content to be printed, respectively.
Apple TV (50:6a:f1)’s major traffic is from port 5353, around 99%. This is from
the application Bonjour that is running over MDNS. Presence of port 7000 indi-
cates that the device is running Apple’s Quick Time Streaming Server. It is used
for streaming media content like audio and video over the Internet. Hence, the pres-
ence of ports 5353 and 7000 indicate that not only is it an Apple device but also a
streaming device like TV. MacMini (aa:8d:ef) is involved in a lot of custom ports,
around 42.49%. This means that it is running a lot of non-system applications. This
could only mean that this is a non-IoT device running various applications. Being an
Apple device, it also uses port 5353 (Bonjour over MDNS) for around 16.76% of the
time. It is also involved in NetBIOS traffic on ports 137 and 138 which are used for
Naming Service and Datagram Service respectively. This is most probably used for
maintaining communication with the printer and sending contents for printing (which
is why its percentage is far lesser).
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a)’s traffic largely is due to port 8001 (53.9%). This port
always uses multicast IP 224.0.0.7. From those information, this is most probably
running a Streaming Server because multicast 224.0.0.7 is reserved for streaming
routers (ST Routers). This is quite expected as the primary purpose of the Samsung
TV is to stream content. But this can be a streaming router if it is streaming content
for other devices and sending it to them. Its next largest traffic comes from port 3955
(7.81%). This port is used in Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP). The device
is sending SSDP NOTIFY messages which is simply advertising about its service.
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This is also expected of Samsung TV as it would be constantly on the look out for
connecting with devices for probably displaying the content they streamed. Port 3942
is also an SSDP Protocol for sending M-Search messages.
We see that the router is the device with the largest number of pre-defined ports
that are involved in system functions. Because compared to any device in the network,
it is the router that would be doing the largest spectrum of tasks. It’s largest traffic is
on port 22, which is used for SSH. This would not be the case for every router. This is
rather because of the high volume of the data that we are collecting every day and the
Raspberry Pi sends them to the router for sending to the remote server. We see SSH
port on the source side because the remote server in-turn would give acknowledgement
as SSH runs over TCP; the router sends the ACK to the Pi (which is the original
sender) and this results in high traffic on port 22 on the sender’s (router’s) side.
The next highest port number is 548 (3.8%); this corresponds to Apple File Sharing
Protocol over TCP. This is a client/server protocol meant to provide file sharing and is
widely used by systems running Mac OS X and use ports 548 or 427. The router must
be running the AFP server to provide shared files for the many Apple clients that we
have on our network. Then comes port 53 for 1.28%. This is the conventional DNS
and the router is bound to have it as it must route traffic from the internal devices
to the outside Internet. And for the implementation of IPSec NAT, it uses NAT-T
port 4500. It also has a variety of other ports used for various functions and roles like
Bootstrap server (port 67), HTTP Service (port 80), HTTPS - Secure HTTP (port
443), NetBIOS Datagram Service (port 137) etc., Thus from the presence of a very
large spectrum of ports and some ports that perform the typical functions of a router
like port 53 and port 67, we can clearly say that device Router (e5:a8:02) is a router.
Coming on to the non-IoT devices like Nest Thermostat, washing machine and
dryer, we see a clear drop in the number of protocols used by them. Regarding all the
Nest Thermostats, port 68 constitutes 100% of their port transmission data. That is
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Table 6.5: Location A - Network Ports Used by IoT Devices while Transmitting
Device Wired Medium Wireless Medium
Source Port Percentage Source Port Percentage
Egauge (00:27:cc) 5353 100% 5353 100%
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 68 100% 68 100%
Nest Thermostat (13:7a:55) 68 100% 68 100%
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 68 100% 68 100%
Washing Machine (34:2d:38)
68 17.39% 68 64.37%
Custom 82.61% Custom 35.63
Dryer (34:3d:61)
Custom 100% 68 5.41%
Custom 94.59%
because most of the activities that the Nest is involved in like ARP, IGMP, ICMP etc.,
take place directly above the MAC Layer, within the LAN. There is no Transport
layer operation involved in those protocols. Only bootp uses transport layer port
(68). Hence we see only port 68 on Nest Thermostat devices; it represents only the
Transport Layer activity. Egauge devices use port 5353% of the time. This port is
used in multicast traffic as well; since Egauge is involved in sending IGMP messages,
it uses port 5353 for its multicast implementation. We see that the washing machine
is sending 17.39% of bootp messages (port 68), which is 2 messages over the entire 4
months. That is quite reasonable as washing machines always stay plugged in. Most
of its traffic is from custom ports (82.61%). Since this is a non-IoT device, these
custom ports would not be resulting from non-system applications but from Simple
Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP). We see that it periodically sends SSDP NOTIFY
messages, announcing its service. This is also the case with the dryer. During the
period of our observation, all its traffic on the wired medium are from SSDP NOTIFY
messages, advertising its services.
6.3.2 Wireless Medium
From tables 6.4 and 6.5 on pages 74 and 79 respectively, show the various ports
employed by the non-IoT and IoT devices on the wireless medium. Compared to the
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wired medium, we generally see a drop on the number of ports used on the wire-
less medium for devices like Apple 0f:fd:22, Apple c7:eb:05, Apple de:65:91, Router,
Printer and Samsung TV; all have a reduced number of unique ports compared to the
wired medium. This proves that they do more tasks on the wired medium and only
fewer tasks on the wireless medium. This is quite reasonable for Apple TV, Samsung
TV and Router as they are involved in data-intensive tasks like content streaming
or relaying traffic between all the devices in the network (Smart TVs), facilitating
their communication with the outside world etc., (Router). Hence, for them, a wired
medium would be a suitable choice. Mac Mini is a stationary device and that also
follows the same trend. Ipads, Laptops etc., would be used more or at least equally
on the wireless medium but since these are portable, they might be taken out of the
house for most of the day; their traffic is measured only when they are at home.
That could be a reason why their wired ports are more in number compared to their
wireless ports.
The IoT devices did not have the difference of reduced wireless ports like non-IoT
devices. The tasks they do are very minimal already and there is no difference in
tasks between both the mediums for them.
Thus, by observing the ports used in Transport Layer communication, one can
clearly get insight into the activities that each device in the network is involved
in.From our analysis, we found that non-IoT devices like Smart TVs, Ipads, Lap-
tops,Routers etc., are involved in a greater spectrum of port numbers compared to
the IoT devices. This reflects the differences in their nature. Non-IoT devices perform
a wide variety of tasks and IoT devices perform fewer tasks. Then there are some
particular ports that clearly point out that the device at hand is a non-IoT one. For
example port 4500 implies that NAT-T is used to facilitate ESP and hence it must
be a device like laptop with lot of resource at hand. Presence of port 5353 indicate
that there is a good chance that the device is an Apple device which uses Bonjour
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application. In addition to port 5353, use of port 7000 indicates that Apple’s Quick
Time Streaming Server is running on the device hence it must be a streaming device
from Apple like TV. Port 8001 indicates that a Streaming Router (ST Router) is
running on the device and there is a good chance that it is a content streaming device
too like smart TV. Presence of a very large variety of ports compared to any device
on the network by itself indicates that the device must be a router. In addition,
router is the only device here with port 53, used for conventional DNS. On behalf
of every device in the network, the router would be contacting the ISP for resolving
IP addresses and hence this is a also good identifier for the router. Presence of port
427 indicates that Server Location Protocol is running on that device and that there
is a good chance for the device to be a printer. The Nest Thermostats are the only
devices here without custom ports. Because they do not give any advertisements
using SSDP like washing machines and dryers. Washing machines and dryers have a
good percentage of custom ports as they continuously advertise their services using
SSDP NOTIFY messages. Hence a combination of the number and types of ports,
along with the presence or absence of particular ports help us in identifying an IoT
and non-IoT device and in some cases, even a particular device.
6.4 How many external servers do devices contact each day?
Devices present inside the network communicate with the outside world on a day
to day basis. Smart TVs stream content from the Internet. Laptops, Smart phones,
Ipads etc., browse the Internet by visiting various websites. They are also used to
access and use cloud applications. IoT devices contact the servers present outside the
network too. Their primary task is to collect data about their environment and send
the collected data to an external server for processing and storage.
But the difference between IoT and non-IoT devices is that while IoT devices
would always be contacting servers dedicated for receiving data from them, non-IoT
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devices would be contacting numerous servers that are totally unrelated to each other.
The servers contacted by IoT devices would often belong to the manufacturer of the
IoT device (or in some cases, third-party data centers). But the servers contacted by
non-IoT devices can be anything on the Internet and it totally depends on the user.
For example, a Nest device would always send data to servers that belong to NestLabs
whereas a laptop would contact the YouTube server when the user watches videos on
YouTube or would contact Netflix when he is streaming a mobie from Netflix.
Hence, observing what IP external IP addresses are contacted by each device
would help us in clearly differentiating between the IoT and non-IoT devices. The
number of unique IPs accessed by the non-IoT devices would be much greater than
that of the IoT devices. Also, from analyzing which servers is contacted, we can
possibly identify the type of device.
6.4.1 Wired Medium
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 on pages 83 and 84 show the various external servers contacted
by some of the devices present inside the network.
By looking at the tables we can clearly see the heterogeneity of the servers con-
tacted by devices like Laptop, Roku, device Apple (0f:fd:22) when compared to the
homogeneity of the servers contacted by Nest Thermostats, Washing Machine and
Dryer. This is a clear indication of the differences between the two types of devices.
IoT devices, being configured to send data to a dedicated server and don’t do any-
thing else much, would have contacted IP addresses belonging to their manufacturer
predominantly (or some third party approved by the manufacturer). Non-IoT de-
vices like laptops, smart phones, TV etc., would have contacted a variety of servers
depending on the various tasks they are doing. This is verified in the results obtained.
Roku communicates with various servers that belong to Netflix Streaming Services
(resulted from watching movies/series in Netflix), Cloudflare Inc. (which provides
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Table 6.6: Location A - External Servers Contacted - Wired Medium - Set 1
Device Wired Medium
Server IP Server Owner
Nest Thermostat (2b:2b:61)
184.72.103.48 Amazon.com, Inc.
204.236.200.82 Amazon.com, Inc.
34.201.170.187 Amazon Technologies Inc.
34.228.244.61 Amazon Technologies Inc.
52.205.137.10 Amazon Technologies Inc.
52.23.198.230 Amazon Technologies Inc.
52.90.9.11 Amazon Technologies Inc.
52.205.137.10 Amazon Data Services NoVa
54.152.107.0 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.152.113.8 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.175.24.43 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.198.192.114 Amazon.com, Inc.
54.205.160.220 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.205.194.200 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.227.150.20 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.88.25.117 Amazon.com, Inc.
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f)
128.119.86.173
University of
Massachusetts (UNIVER-6)
128.119.82.234
University of
Massachusetts
Roku (72:1a:5d)
104.16.55.21 Cloudflare, Inc.
199.127.194.93 Conviva, Inc.
23.213.55.183 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
23.246.6.*
Netflix Streaming
Services Inc.
23.246.7.*
Netflix Streaming
Services Inc.
34.231.219.195 Amazon Technologies Inc.
45.57.45.* Netflix Streaming Services Inc.
52.73.138.113 Amazon Technologies Inc.
54.154.195.110 Amazon Technologies Inc.
8.253.154.102 Level 3 Parent, LLC
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a)
23.215.105.98 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
83.68.80.47 Multimedia S.A., Poland
48.46.49.10 The Prudential Insurance Company of America, US
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) 112.106.186.252 SamsungSDS Inc.
Dryer (34:3d:61) 112.106.186.25 SamsungSDS Inc.
Egauge (00:00:b8) 128.119.245.5
University of
Massachusetts (UNIVER-6)
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Table 6.7: Location A - External Servers Contacted - Wired Medium - Set 2
Device Wired Medium
Server IP Server Owner
Apple (0f:fd:22)
151.101.186.110 Fastly (SKYCA-3)
17.249.108.87 Apple Inc.
17.249.124.31 Apple Inc.
205.234.175.175 CacheNetworks, Inc.
23.35.132.187 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Laptop (1c:ce:28)
104.113.69.137 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
104.20.30.2 Cloudflare, Inc.
104.244.43.48 Twitter, Inc.
104.88.87.78 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
107.152.26.219 Box.com
108.174.11.81 LinkedIn Corporation
151.101.1.167 Fastly (SKYCA-3)
17.249.108.27 Apple Inc.
185.199.110.153 GitHub, Inc.
198.252.206.25 Stack Exchange, Inc.
199.16.156.105 Twitter Inc.
23.192.51.85 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
34.193.66.115 Amazon Technologies Inc.
52.86.105.127 Amazon Technologies Inc.
72.247.63.24 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Ipad (41:a9:38)
17.154.67.26 Apple Inc.
17.249.108.100 Apple Inc.
23.197.35.150 Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Content Delivery and security services), Conviva, Inc. (online AI platform for video
analytics and optimization), Amazon Technologies, Inc. (might be a result of watch-
ing Prime Videos) and Level 3 Communications (probably provides Internet Access).
Not only are these servers varied but also we see that all are aligned towards some
form of video access. Hence a device with mostly external servers associated with
content delivery has to be a content streaming device like Roku. The same is the
case for Laptop (1c:ce:28). We find that the servers accessed by this device belong to
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cloud applications or web applications that are typically accessed from a laptop like
Box.com, GitHub, Inc. , Stack Exchange, Inc. (commonly accessed during develop-
ment phases). In addition we find that it accesses a variety of servers belonging to
Fastly (content delivery and security servcies platform), Twitter, Inc. Akamai Tech-
nologies, Inc. and Amazon Technologies, Inc. Device Apple (0f:fd:22) also accesses
different servers like Fastly, Apple, Inc., CacheNetworks, Inc. All these are indicators
of the variety of applications run by these non-IoT devices or a variety of domains
related to the main purpose of the product (like Roku). Router is the device with the
highest number of external servers contacted. That is the expected result because the
router is the device that communicates with every server outside the local network
on behalf of the devices inside the network.
IoT devices like Nest Thermostats, Washing Machine, Dryer etc., either contact
a single external server or a group of IP addresses that belong to the same provider.
Washing Machine and Dryer, both contact SamsungSDS, Inc., meaning that the
appliance manufacturer is Samsung. That is the only external IP they communicate
with. Nest Thermostats, on the other hand, communicate with a host of IP addresses
but all belong to the same organization, Amazon. This goes to say that Amazon is the
third party approved by NestLabs to store their data (NestLabs could even be using
the tools provided by AWS for their analytics). In a big data center like AWS, there
could be a set of servers that are assigned to NestLabs and the Nest devices could
have been configured to communicate any of them, whichever can serve them at the
moment. Egauge devices all contact only one server, which belongs to the University
of Massachusetts. It could be they are one of the many devices installed there for
experimentation purposes and they were configured to communicate the University
of Massachusetts server.
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6.4.2 Wireless Medium
The number of external servers contacted by the devices on the wireless medium
significantly decrease. IoT devices like Nest Thermostats, Washing Machines and
Dryers do not contact any server over the wireless medium. All their communication
over the wireless medium are related to protocols like ARP, ICMP, IGMP etc., that
operate only on the IP layer and below, within the LAN.
Hence, observing the external servers contacted by each device and analyzing their
degree of homogeneity would give us a clear result as to whether the device is an IoT
or a non-IoT device. IoT devices would have contacted homogenous IP addresses
that belong almost exclusively to their manufacturer or to a third party that was
probably approved by the manufacturer. Non-IoT devices always have a variety of IP
addresses in contact that belong to different organizations. Analyzing the businesses
of those organizations would give us insight into the kind of non-IoT device it could
be. Example, Roku’s external servers all belonged to organizations that provide some
form of content delivery or assist in video access. The servers contacted by the laptop
were ones that are typically accesses by an engineering/software professional. Even if
we are not able to identify what type of device it could be, differentiating them from
IoT devices was quite easy.
6.5 Destination Devices Contacted within the network
Devices present in a LAN (Local Area Network) not only communicate with the
outside but with devices present inside the network too. Observing which device(s)
each device communicates with inside the network will give an insight into how devices
within the LAN interact with one another.
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6.5.1 Wired Medium
Table 6.8 on page 88 shows the list of destination devices that are contacted by
each device on the wired interface during 1 entire data and their corresponding pro-
tocols and percentages. This does not include the multicast MAC addresses that are
used by the various the protocols. The destination addresses under each source device
gives an idea on what devices talk with each other directly, apart from communicating
via multicasting messaging groups.
In general, Devices like Apple 0f:fd:22, Laptop (1c:ce:28), Ipad (41:a9:38), Apple
TV etc., communicate regularly with Aironet ff:ff:00 and LucentTe 00:01:00 which
must be Access Points by Cisco and Alcatel Lucent respectively. Hence these devices,
excluding the devices that do not contact Aironet ff:ff:00 and LucentTe 00:01:00, must
be within the Cisco and Alcatel APs and maintained by them. The interaction be-
tween Samsung TV and Laptop was purely tcp communication. That means that
media from the laptop was sent to the Samsung TV for displying. On an average,
65% of the communication between Roku and Ipad (41:a9:38) were used for sending
data, meaning that contents from Ipad were sent to Roku which is called as mirroring.
Similarly Ipad (41:a9:3e) contacted Samsung TV (50:6a:f1) regularly for content dis-
playing. Raspberry Pi regularly communicated with the router. Among the protocols
used, more than 80% is ssh. This is reasonable because the Pi would be transferring
all the collected data to the router for sending to the remote server. The files are
sent using Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP) that operates over SSH. Devices
Apple de:65:91 and Apple 86:34:26 regularly communicate with Samsung TV to send
content to the Samsung TV for displaying. The devie with the largest number of des-
tination servers is the router. It contacted Laptop (1c:ce:28) over tcp predominantly,
Ipad (41:a9:3e) over tcp, Apple TV (50:6a:f1) using data, ip among other protocols,
MacMini (aa:8d:8f) over ip, data, fb zero, Egauges over tcp, ip, etc., and NestLabs
and Washing Machines and dryers using ip, tcp etc.,
87
Table 6.8: Location A - Destination Devices contacted within the Network on Wired
Interface - 1 days’ data
Source Device Destination Devices Protocol Percentage(in a day)
Apple de:65:91
Aironet ff:ff:00 wlccp 100%
LucentTe 00:01:00 data 100%
Router (e5:a8:02)
Apple TV (50:6a:f1)
arp 69.2%
tcp 23%
wol 7.6%
Apple 86:34:26 tcp 100%
NestLabs 12:05:00 tcp 100%
NestLabs 13:7a:55 tcp 100%
Apple TV (50:6a:f1)
arp 69.2%
tcp 23%
wol 7.6%
Nest Thermostat (2b:2b:61)
tcp 97.7%
data 2.2%
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f)
ssh 95.2%
tcp 4.5%
arp 0.1%
Apple de:65:91
Aironet ff:ff:00 wlccp 100%
LucentTe 00:01:00 data 100%
Table 6.9: Location A - Destination Devices contacted within the Network on Wireless
Interface - 1 days’ data
Source Device Destination Devices Protocol Percentage(in a day)
Router (e5:a8:02) Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14)
tcp 60.9%
ssh 37%
arp 1.9%
bootp 0.2%
AP (ea:b3:5e) Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) eapol 100%
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) Router (e5:a8:02)
ssh 53.1%
tcp 45.3%
arp 1.4%
bootp 0.2%
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) AP (ea:b3:5e) eapol 100%
6.5.2 Wireless Medium
Table 6.9 on page 88 shows the source and destination devices that communicated
over the wireless interface on the same day as the data shown for the wired data. We
see that the Raspberry Pi and the AP communicate regularly over ssh and tcp. This
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is the interface of the Raspberry Pi 1 device that is used to remotely login to the
Pi. Hence, it shows a high percentage of SSH on both the sender and the receiver
side of the device. We see protocol ’eapol’ being used which stands for Extensible
Authentication Protocol over LAN. This was probably used to provide authentication
to the remote login.
Thus by examining the destination device of each communication, we are able to
get an idea about which devices within the LAN talk to each other. We see major
communications involving router. That is expected as routers would be involved in
every communication over wireless medium and it would be constantly communicating
with other devices for network maintenance and other things. The other devices that
we see talking directly to each other are the Samsung TV/Apple TV/Roku with
laptops, Ipads and Iphones. These would be scenarios where content was exchanged
between the devices. Also some of the laptops and Ipads regularly communicated
with Cisco and Alcatel Lucent APs. Probably they are under those APs. That is
why we see them communicating with the APs but not other devices. Raspberry
Pi devices also regularly sent data to the router for sending to external server. IoT
devices predominantly communicated via multicast messages within the LAN and did
not talk to any device directly. This could be one of the markers for identifying IoT
devices.
6.6 Traffic Associated with a device
The traffic associated with a device is the traffic that is both sent and received by
the device. Each device contributes to the traffic associated with the network they
are in by either sending or receiving packets, the basic unit of network traffic. While
the header length is mostly constant across the layers of the network (unless optional
fields are included), the actual data sent or received varies according to the content
(payload). Earlier we examined the traffic that is associated with each device and
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tried to classify them based on various parameters with the data that was available
from outside the network. It yielded good results and helped us differentiate the
devices as IoT and non-IoT devices and narrow down the type of device in some
cases. But now we are observing the traffic from inside the network. So we should be
able to get much more insights about the devices.
Also, along with examining the traffic characteristics of the devices, we would also
try to group devices of similar behaviour under each parameter, so that it will help
us in profiling each device.
6.6.1 How much Traffic do Devices Send and Receive ?
As we discussed in previous chapter, the traffic volume of a device (traffic that is
both sent and received) would indicate whether the device is a conventional device
connected to the Internet like a smart phone or a laptop or an IoT device whose
traffic would be considerably less than that of the non-IoT devices. Because devices
like laptops and smart phones are used for various purposes like browsing the Internet,
streaming content, accessing cloud application etc., they would have a higher traffic
volume associated with them. But IoT devices often would perform one dedicated
task Hence their traffic would be much lower than a non-IoT device.
Just as we measured the various parameters associated with device traffic from
the data we captued externally, we would do the same measure internally. We would
take the same Table 5.14 on page 45 for grouping our devices based traffic volume.
6.6.1.1 Wired Medium
Table 6.10 on page 91 shows the average traffic of each device taken over 4 months.
At the outset, we see more number of devices than we saw from outside the network.
Because, when we are outside, packets from devices that are too far away will not
reach us. But inside the network, the multiple APs present extend the network and
the signal to ensure all devices wanting to communicate can easily do so. Hence we
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Table 6.10: Location A - Average Traffic generated in
a minute on Wired Medium
Device
Avg. of
Mean(Bytes)
Traffic
Category
Egauge (00:00:b8) 64.11 Very Low
Egauge (00:27:cc) 69.15 Very Low
AP (ea:b3:5e) 76.04 Very Low
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 97.03 Very Low
Nest Thermostat (15:3c:6e) 100.63 Very Low (Borderline)
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 101.7 Low (Borderline)
Raspberry Pi 1 (35:bb:d5) 102.82 Low
Insteon Hub (46:fa:a7) 142.84 Low
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) 143.67 Low
Apple Macmini (ba:b3:d6) 160.7 Low
Tp-LinkT 49:07:24 161.73 Low
Nintendo 09:28:c7 197.03 Low
Apple Ipad (0d:3e:23) 217.45 Low
Printer (08:bf:14) 279.4 Low
Roku AP (72:1a:5d) 444.83 Low
Apple Ipad (41:a9:3e) 773.34 Mid-High
Nintendo fa:9d:30 895.43 Mid-High
Laptop (47:d9:d9) 1002.0 High (Borderline)
Apple Ipad (41:a9:38) 1179.52 High
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) 1188.39 High
ObihaiTe 62:e9:8e 1240.0 High
Apple Iphone (85:f7:1d) 1386.83 High
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 1954.62 High
Mac Mini (aa:8d:ef) 3818.52 High
Dryer (34:3d:61) 7513.62 Very High
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) 11007.3 Extremely High
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) 15626.4 Extremely High
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) 410221.6 Extremely High
Router (e5:a8:02) 412712.0 Extremely High
are able to see more number of devices from the inside. By looking at the table, we
see a clear difference between the traffic volume of non-IoT devices like Apple TV,
Router, Samsung TV, Raspberry Pi (because it collects the data and sends it over to
the remote server) and IoT devices like Egauge devices, Nest Thermostats, Washing
Machine etc., This is a clear marker for the two kinds of devices. Earlier, we saw that
Egauge devices are only involved in IGMP multicast communication; hence, their
traffic is quite low. Nest thermostats also performed relatively low number of tasks like
arp, icmp, igmp and mdns. Hence, their traffic is also low. On the other hand, Smart
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TVs are involved in content streaming which is very data-intensive. The router too
would be relaying all the traffic between the devices to facilitate their communication.
Hence these devices have extremely high traffic. It is surprising to see the dryer to
have a very high traffic. But these are not data but just SSDP NOTIFY messages
advertising its services. Of the two Nintendo devices, one Nintendo (09:28:c7) has
very less traffic than Nintendo (fa:9d:30). This means is used more often than the
other. MacMini (aa:8d:ef) has a high traffic. Earlier we saw that it was running
a lot of custom ports. Hence it must be running a lot of non-system applications.
Both the laptops Laptop (1c:ce:28) and laptop (47:d9:d9) also have high amounts
of traffic. This is expected as laptops would be used for a variety of purposes like
browsing internet, using cloud applications, etc., TP-Link has a low traffic; it means
it is most probably used as an AP to extend the network and does not so any routing
functions. We see that Ipad (0d:3e:23) has a low traffic. Most probably because
we are measuring traffic on the wired medium and it is not connected to the wired
medium often. Of the two Raspberry Pi devices, Pi 1 collects traffic in monitor mode
and Pi 2 in promiscuous mode. Therefore, Pi 1 would have more data to send to the
remote server than the Pi 2. Hence its traffic is higher than that of Pi 2. And the
various other devices also vary in their traffic volume and fall into different categories
according to their activities. Hence aveage traffic is a realiable indicator of the type
of device concerned.
6.6.1.2 Wireless Medium
Table 6.11 on page 93 shows the traffic volume average of various devices calculated
over the wireless medium. Egauge devices, as observed before, have a low traffic on
wireless medium as well. The Raspberry Pi 2, which is used for capturing data
from inside the network has 2 interfaces on the wireless medium. The interface
43:46:83 is put in promiscuous mode for passively capturing the packets. Though it
92
Table 6.11: Location A - Average Traffic generated in
a minute on Wireless Medium
Device
Avg. of
Mean(Bytes)
Traffic
Category
Egauge (00:04:a4) 61.68 Very Low
Egauge (00:27:cc) 65.91 Very Low
Raspberry Pi 2 (43:46:83) 46.48 Very Low
Tp-LinkT 49:07:24 80.99 Very Low
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) 62.3 Very Low
Apple Ipad (0d:3e:23) 170.58 Low
Apple Ipad (41:a9:3e) 210.08 Low
AP (ea:b3:5e) 289.96 Low
Roku 6b:2a:89 128.17 Low
Roku 72:1a:5d 389.49 Low
Insteon Hub (46:fa:a7) 142.78 Low
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) 117.77 Low
Apple Ipad (41:a9:38) 709.69 Mid-High
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 780.93 Mid-High
Nest Thermostat (14:48:4b) 684.67 Mid-High
Nintendo (09:28:c7) 519.43 Mid-High (Borderline)
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 766.68 Mid-High
ObihaiTe 62:e9:8e 930.0 Mid-High
Printer (08:bf:14) 2309.61 High
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 1083.8 High
Apple Macmini (aa:8d:ef) 4799.42 High (Borderline)
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) 2525.95 High
Dryer (34:3d:61) 3423.14 High
Router (e5:a8:02) 12326.51 Extremely High
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) 11519.33 Extremely High
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) 15320.79 Extremely High
captures packets from all the devices, the packets intended for it (packets sent with
this particular interface as the destination address) would be very less and it hardly
sends out any packet as well. Hence its traffic is very low. But interface 28:4c:14 is
used for other communication and for logging in from the remote server; therefore that
interface has higher traffic. Tp-link is a wireless router. From the low traffic on the
wireless interface, it is probably used as a wireless distribution system, a system that
interconnects APs in a network eliminating the need for a wired backbone. Raspberry
Pi 1 is the device that is used to capture the traffic externally in monitor mode. It
sends the collected data via the wired medium. Because we could see a high traffic for
this device on the wired medium (It is common for interfaces on different medium on
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the same device to have the same MAC address; since the interfaces will never overlap,
this is not a problem). In that case, it would not be used much for anything else and
hence, the low traffic. Ipads 0d:3e:23 and 41:a9:3e and devices Apple 61:b1:70 and
Apple c7:eb:05 all have low traffic. This could either be because these devices are
not used very much or they could be a little far away from the point of data capture
that not all packets from them are captured successfully. Roku devices also show a
low traffic; may be devices like Apple TV and Samsung TV are used more than the
Roku and hence the low traffic. Because even on the wired interface, Roku device
has a very low traffic. Insteon Hubs are devices used to interface with the many
smart devices present at home and access them remotely via smart phones. Based
on its purpose, its traffic would be in sporadic short bursts when it communicates
with another smart device for any action to-dos; there is no other content involved
and hence the low traffic. Nest Thermostats, being IoT devices, would naturally
have a traffic lesser than conventional devices since they perform only limited set of
tasks. We can see that reflected on the wireless medium as well. Mac Mini (aa:8d:ef),
as expected has a high traffic. Printer has a higher traffic on the wireless medium
than the wired. This is reasonable because documents for printers would often be
sent from devices like smart phones and laptops that connect to the printer via the
wireless medium. Hence the high wireless traffic. Thus the variations in the mean
value of Traffic volume gives us a clear idea on what kind of device it could be.
Comparing this result with the result that we got from analysis of the external
data, though each device does not fall under the same category of Traffic Volume as it
did on the external data, we can see that the relative ordering of the devices is largely
unchanged. We are measuring both the categories with the same scale, but internally
we would capture more data as we are inside the network. Hence, the magnitude of
the data might be larger internally and the categories might be different, but still
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each is effective in differentiating IoT and non-IoT devices in the point where the
data is captured - internal or external.
6.6.2 Do Devices consistently send the same amount of traffic everyday?
In the previous section, we saw how much traffic devices send and receive on an
average. But that does not give us any idea about the fluctuations in traffic. For
example, as we saw in the previous chapter, the usage of a non-IoT device would vary
day to day, from user to user. As these devices have human intervention and assist the
user in their daily tasks, their traffic is swayed by the user. For example, a smart TV’s
traffic would largely depend on how much the occupants of the house watch TV. And
it is highly unlikely that they watch exactly the same amount of TV everyday. But
IoT devices, on the other hand, require little to no human intervention; therefore their
traffic largely depends on their environment. Hence unless there is a drastic change
in the environment, their behaviour will not vary. Eg: Nest Thermostat radically
changes its degree of activity when the winter passes and spring/summer comes; but
until then it is mostly consistent in its behaviour. Therefore measuring how much a
device’s traffic sways could be a good indication of its nature.
We would use the same Table 5.18 on page 52 that we used for the external data,
for grouping our internal data too.
6.6.2.1 Wired Interface
Table 6.12 on page 96 shows the variance values of the average traffic for various
devices and their fluctuation categories.
We can see that devices with low traffic fluctuation i.e., small standard deviation
from the mean traffic are the IoT devices like Egauges, Nest Thermostats and Washing
machines. Egauges fall under Level 1 Fluctuation Category whereas Nest Thermostats
and washing machines fall under Level 2. This means that their traffic consistently
stayed within a very low swaying margin over the days that we captured the data.
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Table 6.12: Location A - Fluctuations in Traffic on Wired Medium
Device
Avg. of
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Variance
Fluctuation
Category
Laptop (47:d9:d9) 1002.0 0.0 0.0 Level 0
ObihaiTe 62:e9:8e 1240.0 0.0 0.0 Level 0
AP (ea:b3:5e) 76.04 3.56 100.77 Level 1
Egauge (00:00:b8) 64.11 15.02 310.46 Level 1
Egauge (00:27:cc) 69.15 28.34 868.98 Level 1
Raspberry Pi 1 (35:bb:d5) 102.82 83.65 34739.28 Level 1
Raspberry Pi 2 (43:46:83) 64.87 36.35 10322.12 Level 1
Insteon Hub (46:fa:a7) 142.84 69.61 6206.27 Level 1
Apple Ipad (0d:3e:23) 217.45 183.69 55422.89 Level 2
Apple MacMini (ba:b3:d6) 160.7 181.48 35852.1 Level 2
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 101.7 139.4 134261.11 Level 2
Nest Thermostat (13:7a:55) 93.92 114.34 118014.85 Level 2
Nest Thermostat (14:48:4b) 111.1 180.49 223682.08 Level 2
Nintendo 09:28:c7 197.03 171.28 49826.3 Level 2
Nintendo fa:9d:30 895.43 114.57 44026.14 Level 2
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) 143.67 129.6 46684.66 Level 2
Tp-LinkT 49:07:24 161.73 273.5 2963968.0 Level 3
Roku 72:1a:5d 444.83 699.09 618832.0 Level 7 (Borderline)
Ipad (41:a9:3e) 773.34 862.14 1795364.41 Level 9
Iphone (85:f7:1d) 1386.83 984.83 1027020.12 Level 10
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 1954.62 1661.88 4699611.11 Level 11
Ipad (41:a9:38) 1179.52 1167.95 2060067.23 Level 11
Printer (08:bf:14) 279.4 1065.29 1548739.84 Level 11
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) 1188.39 2164.68 17180696.97 Level 12
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) 11007.3 4526.25 21387478.26 Level 14
MacMini (aa:8d:ef) 3818.52 4800.43 34065583.33 Level 14
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) 15626.4 7397.75 56813920.0 Level 17
Router (e5:a8:02) 412712.0 1595776.0 7640400000000.0 Level 20
Dryer (34:3d:61) 7513.62 18833.97 2113305785.12 Level 20
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) 410221.6 1595864.0 7641592000000.0 Level 20
Because in the previous sections, we saw that they were only involved in regular
multicast messaging and ARP messages and did not involve in any data related task.
For Nest Thermostats it could be because that the data was collected during the
summer months and they did not do much. Hence there is nothing to sway their
traffic. Washing machine sends SSDP traffic from custom ports but we see that it is
regular in its advertisement unlike the dryer. We know that the dryer sends SSDP
NOTIFY messages from the previous sections. From the high fluctuation, we can
conclude that it does not advertise in the same rate everyday. Nintendo devices also
have a high fluctuation. That is expected because its traffic would vary depending
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on how much it is used and it is unlikely that it is used for the same amount of time
everyday. Printer (08:bf:14) also has a high fluctuation. This is expected because it
would receive documents for printing only sporadically. The rest of the devices like
Samsung TV, Apple TV, Router all have highly fluctuating traffic. Because the Smart
TVs would vary depending on usage and the router’s traffic would always depend on
the traffic of its internal devices. The Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) would also have
varied traffic depending on the devices inside the network as it is only sending the
data it captured from the devices inside. Laptops, Iphones and Ipads all have high
traffic fluctuation as they would also have varied traffic depending on usage. The
same is the case for MacMini too. Thus the average traffic, combined with how much
the traffic fluctuates could easily help us in differentiating IoT and non-IoT devices.
6.6.2.2 Wireless Interface
Table 6.13 on page 98 shows the traffic fluctuation for various devices under wire-
less medium. We see the same scenario reflected on the wireless medium also. Devices
like Egauge, Nest Thermostats, Washing machine all have low traffic fluctuation as
expected. And devices like router (e5:a8:02) and Apple TV (50:6a:f1) have highly
fluctuating traffic. We see that Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) has a low fluctuation on the
wireless medium. This must be resulting from the device using the wired interface
more than the wireless interface; contents to be streamed are fetched via the wired
interface. This is proven in the previous section, where we can see that the average
traffic of Samsung TV on wired is much higher than the average traffic in wireless
medium. Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) is the built-in interface of the Pi and it is not
used much, consistently. Hence its traffic as well as fluctuation is low. Raspberry Pi
2 (28:4c:14), the interface that is used primarily for logging in from the server, has
a high fluctuation. This is reasonable as I do not login everyday. Sometimes I login
once a week and close the connection immediately. Sometimes I keep the connected
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Table 6.13: Location A - Fluctuations in Traffic on Wireless Medium
Device
Avg. of
Mean
Standard
Deviation
Variance
Fluctuation
Category
Nest Thermostat (15:3c:6e) 632.0 0.0 0.0 Level 0
Nest Thermostat (2b:2b:61) 632.0 0.0 0.0 Level 0
Ipad (0d:3e:23) 170.58 90.74 14915.33 Level 1
AP (ea:b3:5e) 289.96 57.69 5866.26 Level 1
Egauge (00:00:b8) 61.51 8.32 95.22 Level 1
Egauge (00:27:cc) 65.91 22.24 540.28 Level 1
Raspberry Pi 2 (43:46:83) 46.48 3.55 22.0 Level 1
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 780.93 75.52 28515.4 Level 1
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 595.08 53.48 8704.83 Level 1
Nintendo (fa:9d:30) 766.68 88.91 28932.97 Level 1
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) 62.3 15.57 3111.44 Level 1
Roku 72:1a:5d 389.49 57.24 11255.04 Level 1
Insteon Hub (46:fa:a7) 142.78 77.08 9422.6 Level 1
Tp-LinkT 49:07:24 80.99 44.99 2443.32 Level 1
Nest Thermostat (14:48:4b) 684.67 100.45 40362.25 Level 2 (Borderline)
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) 2525.95 190.87 41983.9 Level 2
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) 117.77 101.04 32454.39 Level 2 (Borderline)
Nintendo 09:28:c7 519.43 300.26 90154.3 Level 3 (Borderline)
Roku 6b:2a:89 128.17 224.35 60428.57 Level 3
Ipad (41:a9:3e) 210.08 352.6 840862.79 Level 4
ObihaiTe 62:e9:8e 930.0 395.98 313600.0 Level 4
Ipad (41:a9:38) 709.69 690.36 603082.5 Level 7
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 1083.8 829.25 1209028.95 Level 9
Printer (08:bf:14) 2309.61 2211.96 7435017.54 Level 12
Macmini (aa:8d:ef) 4799.42 5186.6 32349473.68 Level 15
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) 15320.79 7423.67 58018771.93 Level 17
Dryer (34:3d:61) 3423.14 7055.75 54827368.42 Level 17
Router (e5:a8:02) 12326.51 100515.96 22020350877.19 Level 20
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) 11519.33 102765.96 22789473684.21 Level 20
session open for hours and days together. Hence the high fluctuation. The dryer also
has highly fluctuating traffic. Printer (08:bf:14) also has a highly varying wireless
traffic. As said before, this totally depends and when and how much documents are
sent to it for printing over the wireless interface. Therefore the fluctuation rates of
each device, both on its wired and wireless interface, will give us a unique foot print
of each device based on its behaviour in both the interfaces combined. Nintendo
(fa:9d:30) has Level 1 variance on the wireless interface but had Level 2 variance on
the wired interface. That means it’s traffic fluctuated more on the wired interface
comparatively. But there does not seem to be a big difference in the usage between its
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wired and wireless interfaces as both have almost the same average traffic and traffic
does not fluctuate largely. But Nintendo (09:28:c7) had a low traffic on wired medium
and mid-high traffic on wireless and a fluctuation category of Level 2 on wired and
Level 3 on wireless; this means it did not use its wired interface consistently and
wireless has been used now and then with large variations. This difference in the
traffic average and its variance can be used to distinguish between the two Nintendo
devices. Similarly, every device would have a unique combination of traffic mean and
its variance according to usage. This could be taken advantage of when trying to
identify individual devices.
6.7 Do Devices only send data or receive data or both ?
In the previous chapter we tried to analyze the traffic direction of the devices using
the data we got from outside the network. We would try to evaluate the devices again
under the same criterion but with data collected from inside the network. Analyzing
whether a device has only outgoing data or incoming data or both would give us one
more factor to differentiate the IoT and non-IoT devices and then further identify the
devices themselves possibly. Conventional non-IoT devices must have mixed traffic
depending on their usage and the applications they run. Devices like laptops and
smart phones may have varying outgoing and incoming traffic depending on their
activities. On days when movies are watched, their incoming traffic would be high.
On days where they interact with cloud applications and upload large files, their
outgoing traffic would be high. IoT devices may not consistently send and receive
traffic in equal amounts at all times. They are designed to collect and send data
to servers and at the same time they also participate in Link Level protocols like
arp, igmp etc., Sometimes they may send more traffic than they receive via tha LAN
protocols. Hence, analyzing the direction of predominant traffic of a device would
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prove to be another factor in differentiating various devices. It would also give us
better understanding about the behaviour of the device.
6.7.1 Wired Interface
Table 6.14 on page 101 shows the percentage of days where each device was sending
both in and out traffic or only outgoing traffic or received only incoming traffic.
First taking the Nest Thermostats, we find that they have mixed traffic on most
of the days i.e., they both send and receive data on more than 80% of the days. We
know that on the wired medium they have sent ARP requests, ICMP packets, IGMP
packets, participated in multicast DNS, sent data to external server etc., On the re-
ceiver side, they have received acknowledgements for the packets they sent to the
external servers, received messages from the multicast group. Router was exclusively
having mixed traffic on all days; this is as expected because router relays the com-
munication between all devices and hence would have mixed traffic. Raspberry Pi 1
(b7:e0:1f) also has mixed traffic because it would be sending the collected data as well
as communicate with other devices on the network. For Ipads and laptop (1c:ce:28),
days where they had exclusively outgoing traffic were higher than the days where they
had mixed traffic. This could be because on some days, their wired interface were not
used for anything but sending out media content to the smart TVs for displaying.
Egauge devices also have more days where they just send data than the days where
the traffic is mixed. That means, on some days, they send only the collected data to
server and do not do anything much. Washing Machines and Dryers also have high
percentage of exclusively outgoing traffic. This might most probably because they
were simply adversitising their services on most of the days without doing anything
else.
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Table 6.14: Location A - Classification based on Traffic Direction - Both In and
Out, Only Out and Only In - On Wired Medium
Device
Both In
and Out(%)
Only
Out(%)
Only
In(%)
Direction
Category
Router (e5:a8:02) 100.0 0.0 0.0 Exclusively Mixed
Raspberry Pi 1 (b7:e0:1f) 100.0 0.0 0.0 Exclusively Mixed
Ipad (0d:3e:23) 40.0 60.0 0.0 Only Out > Mixed
Laptop (1c:ce:28) 47.71 52.29 0.0 Only Out > Mixed
Apple TV (50:6a:f1) 57.94 42.06 0.0 Mixed > Only Out
Iphone (85:f7:1d) 55.56 44.44 0.0 Mixed > Only Out
MacMini (aa:8d:ef) 54.55 45.45 0.0 Mixed > Only Out
Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) 51.52 48.48 0.0 Mixed > Only Out
Ipad (41:a9:38) 28.33 71.67 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Ipad (41:a9:3e) 3.36 96.64 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Egauge (00:00:b8) 29.37 70.63 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Egauge (00:27:cc) 0.79 99.21 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Raspberry Pi 2 (43:46:83) 6.06 93.94 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Nintendo fa:9d:30 4.29 95.71 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Roku 72:1a:5d 30.16 69.84 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Samsung TV (e1:c2:0a) 13.79 86.21 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Washing Machine (34:2d:38) 4.2 95.8 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Dryer (34:3d:61) 5.74 94.26 0.0 Only Out  Mixed
Nest Thermostat (12:05:00) 86.51 0.0 13.49 Mixed  Only In
Nest Thermostat (14:48:4b) 84.13 0.79 15.08 Mixed  Only In, Negligible Only Out
Nest Thermostat (14:58:68) 83.2 0.0 16.8 Mixed  Only In
6.7.2 Wireless Interface
The anlysis done on the wireless interface regarding traffic direction did not yield
substantial results to differentiate the IoT and non-IoT devices. Most of the devices
had exclusively outgoing traffic. That might be a result of the devices being relatively
less active on the wireless medium when compared to the wired medium and not
sending out any actual data. Results shown on tables 6.10 and 6.11 on pages 91
and 93 show the stark contrast in the average of the traffic for each device. In
wired medium, the increase in traffic from device to device was gradual as almost all
the devices were fully active over the wired medium. But increase in traffic is very
abrupt on the wireless medium, with most of the devices having significantly lower
traffic mean and the only devices with high traffic on the wireless medium were Apple
TV, Router, Raspberry Pi 2 (28:4c:14) (which is used to communicate with the Pi
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remotely) and surprisingly, dryer (Because of its high amount of SSDP messages).
Hence, this section did not yield sufficient results.
6.8 Conclusion
Thus in this chapter, we examined what could be learned about the IoT devices
and other devices while observing the traffic from inside the network. We were able
to learn a lot about the devices using information got from protocols, network ports
and external IP addresses they contacted. From the protocols and the ports, we came
to know exactly what type of activity was undertaken by each device and how those
activities differ between IoT and non-IoT devices. The external servers contacted by
each device gave us an idea about the nature of their interaction with the devices
outside the network. From the destination devices contacted by each device, we were
able to learn about the interactions between the devices within the LAN. Then we
measured the various network characteristics like traffic volume of each device, how
their traffic fluctuates, what is their predominant traffic direction etc., Under each of
those parameters, we were clearly able to see how IoT devices from non-IoT devices
and how, by the presence of certain features, we could pin point to one device. Using
this information, we can create a profile for each device with the information we have
from how they fared under each parameter. Such profiles can help us in understanding
whether the new devices that we would encounter in the future are IoT or non-IoT
devices and and even help identify the specific device. That is the next step in this
thesis.
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CHAPTER 7
CLUSTERING
Now that we have analyzed the data that is got from both inside the outside and
outside the network, we would like to group similar devices together automatically,
using clustering.
Clustering is a form of unsupervised learning where in data sets are grouped
together into various clusters so that similar items belong to one group. It is unsu-
pervised because we do not say explicitly what makes a set of data points similar.
This makes unsupervised learning a better choice for this case, as the algorithms will
try to cluster the devices based on the innate characteristics that is present in the
data sets of the devices.
We choose to use K-Means, as it is one of the simplest and fastest clustering
algorithms. We have data from three sections namely External Wireless, Internal
Wired and Internal Wireless. We would perform clustering on each section of the
data to see how devices fare in them. We would also compare the clustering results
between the External and Internal data to determine how good is the external data
when compared to the internal data.
This would help us in,
• Learning the network signature strength of different devices - thereby help us
in identifying different group of devices and even identify particular devices
• Investigate the difference in the network signature of devices between the Inter-
nal and External data capture - this would help us in establishing whether the
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external data capture contains enough data to still obtain a good signature for
devices that have a strong network signature internally also
• Enable profiling of smart homes - just by looking at the data that is got exter-
nally on the outside of the network, anyone would be able to profile a smart
home, meaning that they would be able to identify the different groups of de-
vices present in the home
7.1 Defining Network Signature
Since we would like to learn the network signatures of various devices, we would
first define a network signature. A network signature shows how strong is the presence
of the device in the network and it is measured from the device’s network data. Hence,
as we experimentally increase the number of clusters, we are looking for the following
signs,
• When do similar devices emerge together as a cluster ?
• How persistent are the similar devices in staying together in a cluster ?
• What is the degree of exclusivity in the cluster - are only those similar devices
present or are other devices present ? If other other devices are present, to what
degree ? What is the percentage of these similar devices in that cluster ?
Hence going by that definition, devices that have a stronger signature would go
into single clusters very early. And there is a higher probability that those single
clusters would be exclusive for devices with stronger signatures. They would also
stay in that exclusive cluster for longer. But devices that have a weak signature on
the other hand, will go into single exclusive clusters very late. Also they will not stay
longer in those clusters; they would break apart much easily.
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7.1.1 Quantifying Signature Strength
We came up with a simple formula to quantify the network signature. This is
a way to qualitatively visualize the network signature of the devices. Figure 7.1 on
page 105 shows the formula for calculating signature strength of various devices.
Figure 7.1: Formula for calculating Signature Strength
In our experiment, as we increase the number of clusters, we take the number of
clusters at which the device at hand (includes all devices of a particular kind, eg: all
Nest Devices) becomes an exclusive cluster. To really appreciate how early or late
that step is, we also take into account when the clustering reaches convergence i.e.,
the devices would no longer separate into new clusters.
7.1.2 Identifying Parameters Unique to a device
If we want to create a profile for each kind of device, it is important to identify
the top parameters that contribute to the shift in the clusters when the devices go
into exclusive clusters. These are the parameters that are unique to that device
and constitute the profile of the device. To identify those parameters, we take the
centroids of the clusters where these devices become exclusive and the centroid of
the same cluster in the previous iteration. We find the squared difference between
the two clusters and identify the parameters that have the highest difference. These
are the parameters that pushed the devices to go into an exclusive cluster. For our
experiment, we identify the top 5 parameters for each device.
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Figure 7.2: Identifying Parameters Unique to a device
7.2 Input Data to the Clustering Algorithm
7.2.1 External Wireless
On the external data capture, data from 292 devices were observed. Since we are
capturing the data in monitor mode, without associating with any network, this data
includes data from all the devices that are within range of the capture, irrespective
of the network they belong to. The parameters that were considered are:
• Traffic Volume
• Fluctuation in Traffic Volume
• Outbound and Inbound Traffic Percentage
• Frequency of State Change of power (sleep/awake)
• Fluctuation in Frequency of State Change of power
The input data dimension for external data is 292 x 9. The data is normalized
before feeding to the algorithm.
7.2.2 Internal Wired and Wireless
On the internal data capture, data from around 69 devices were observed on the
wireless interface and data from around 50 devices were observed on the wired inter-
face. Since we are observing the data internally in promiscuous mode, this includes
data from only devices that are present in the host network. The parameters consid-
ered are:
• Average Traffic Volume
• Fluctuation in Traffic Volume
• Outbound and Inbound Traffic Percentage
• Number of Type of Protocols
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• Number of Type of Ports
The input data dimension is 50 x 70 for Internal Wired and 69 x 74 for Internal
Wireless. For combined internal clustering is 50 x 144. The data is normalized before
feeding into the algorithm.
7.3 Cluster Progression - External vs. Internal
From the clustering done on the external data, we can see that the devices are
divided into various clusters based on the traffic data. Because externally, the data
observed primarily consists of traffic data and power management information. But
on the other hand, the internal data consists of a lot of device specific data. Therefore,
when the clusters divide initially, they are based on this device specific information
rather than the traffic data. Also, by using the squared difference between the cen-
troids of successive iterations, we were able to identify precisely which parameters
induced the shift towards a particular cluster. Those parameters are the characteris-
tic features of the device.
Figure 7.3: Clustering Progression of External Data
Figure 7.3 on page 107 shows the progression of clustering on the external data.
At the beginning, when the number of clusters are 6, we can see that the devices are
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grouped into clusters based on some attribute of their traffic. The washing machine
and dryer go into separate clusters because the percentage of days where they had
completely outbound traffic are similar. The Apple devices are grouped together
because their outbound traffic is close to 100%. All the Nest Devices are grouped
as one because their average traffic as well their fluctuation in the frequency of state
change (sleep/active) are similar, extremely high traffic devices come under one cluster
and one cluster has devices that have no/negligible observed data and one more cluster
has non-IoT devices. When the number of clusters are increased to 9, the cluster
that had non-IoT devices further breaks into non-IoT devices whose percentage of
days where they had mixed traffic are similar, Nintendo devices that have similar
inbound and outbound percentage and the rest of the devices in that cluster. The
Apple devices break into two clusters with high and low traffic respectively. Further
when he number of clusters are increased to 12, the clusters further break based on
parameters that turn out to be exactly same for some devices and not so same for
other devices.
Figure 7.4: Clustering Progression of Internal Data
Figure 7.4 on page 108 shows the clustering progression of the internal data. At the
outset, we can see that that initial clustering are not based on just traffic volume but
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rather on device-specific parameters. When the number of clusters are 6, all the Nest
devices come under a cluster with some other devices. Then there is another cluster
with devices like Egauges, washing machine, dryer and some more devices. Then
another cluster has exclusively router in it. The router goes into a separate cluster
very early because of the presence of device-specific markers like presence of ports
22(SSH), 67(Bootp server), 80(HTTP), 443(HTTPS) etc., Raspberry Pi also goes into
a separate cluster because it uniquely has a very low wireless traffic fluctuation. Many
of the Apple devices come under one cluster which has predominantly Apple devices;
they all have similar outbound traffic percentage. When the number of clusters are
increased to 9, the cluster with predominantly Nest devices breaks into two clusters
with mostly Nest and a Raspberry Pi device. Cluster with Egauges, Washers, Dryers
and others break into two clusters with mostly IoT and non-IoT devices respectively.
The Router and the Raspberry Pi continue as such. The cluster that had mostly Apple
devices further divides into two clusters with low to mid traffic Apple devices and mid
to extremely high traffic Apple devices. On successive iterations, the devices further
move into more specific clusters. But the main difference between the external and
internal cluster progression is that externally the initial clusters and the subsequent
grouping were based on traffic parameters and power management state change data.
Internally, the initial clusters were formed based on the device specific data that
distinguishes types of devices readily. This data is not available externally.
7.4 Internal Wired
On the Internal Wired medium, there are around 50 devices. To give equal weight
to all the parameters, we normalize the data and feed them into the algorithm. At
the first iteration itself, we see that the devices are grouped into more or less mean-
ingful clusters - non-IoT devices with a mid-range traffic, devices with low traffic and
fluctuation (both IoT and non-IoT devices), non-IoT devices with extremely high
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traffic etc., And as the number of clusters increase, the devices are grouped into more
and more specific clusters. One note-worthy observation throughout the iterations
in Internal Wired devices is that, beginning from when the number of clusters are 9
to the iteration where the number of clusters are 37, all the Nest Thermostats, and
Nest Thermostats alone, are present in one cluster. Though other devices increasingly
form clusters that solely consist of that device alone, right from when the number
of clusters are 9, the Nest Thermostats all stay exclusively in one group until the
number of clusters reach 37. This goes to show that all the Nest Thermostats are
very similar in their behaviour and they have a very strong signature in the network.
Figure 7.5 on page 110 illustrates the clustering progression of the Nest devices on
the wired medium. It shows how Nest has a strong signature here as initially, its
clusters have more than 75% Nest. Then it moves into exclusive cluster quickly.
Figure 7.5: Clustering Progression of Nest Thermostats - Wired medium
Other IoT devices like Egauges, Washing Machine and Dryer were in a single
cluster initially. Then, when clusters are 7, three of the Egauge devices (00:00:b8,
00:04:04, Mosberge 0a:28) were clustered together (not exclusively - had other devices
in the cluster too) and one Egauge (00:27:cc), Washing machine and Dryer were in
a separate cluster together (not exclusively). When clusters are 12, the initial three
Egauge devices went into an exclusive cluster (no other devices). These three Egauge
devices remain in this exclusive cluster until the iteration where the number of clusters
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are 40. Hence, these Egauge devices also have a signature in the network. But their
signature is not as strong as that of the Nest Thermostats.
The other Egauge device, Washing machine and Dryer continue to remain in a
cluster with other non-IoT devices. This trend continues and when the clusters are
19, the Washing machine and Dryer go into a separate cluster (not exclusively) and
the other Egauge device goes into another cluster (not exclusively). When clusters are
30, the other Egauge device goes into a cluster of its own (solely has that device alone)
and the Washing Machine and Dryer remain in a separate cluster (not exclusively).
When the number of clusters are 36, Washing machine goes into a cluster of its own.
When the number of clusters are 44, Dryer goes into a cluster of its own.
Devices like Router and Raspberry Pi, which are very unique in the network in
terms of network traffic (both very high traffic) and in terms of their activity (Router
- highest spectrum of tasks in the network, Raspberry Pi - single purpose which is
to collect and send data) very quickly go into clusters of their own, right from the
iteration when the number of clusters are 6. Samsung TV goes into an exclusive
cluster from when the number of clusters are 11. From this we can infer that these
devices are very unique in the network and hence quickly form exclusive clusters.
From this clustering, we can clearly see that devices that exhibit a very strong
signature like Nest Thermostats and Egauge devices (though not all) stay in exclusive
clusters through most of the iterations. Other unique devices like Router, Raspberry
Pi, Samsung TV also exhibit their uniqueness in the network by going into exclusive
clusters very early in the iterations.
7.5 Internal Wireless
On the Internal Wireless medium, there are around 69 devices. Comparing the
results of clustering on these devices to the results from the Internal Wired devices
clustering, we find that the Nest Thermostats do not have a strong signature on the
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Wireless medium as they had on the Wired medium. Up until when the number of
clusters are 27, the Nest Thermostats stay in a cluster with other non-IoT devices.
After that, they increasingly break into various clusters, either exclusively or non-
exclusively. Figure 7.6 on page 112 illustrates the clustering progression of the Nest
devices on the wireless medium. Initially it stays in a cluster where only 20% to 50%
of the devices are Nest. Then gradually moves into successive clusters where more
and more devices are Nest until they finally move into a cluster where 100% of the
devices are Nest.
Figure 7.6: Clustering Progression of Nest Thermostats - Wireless medium
All of the Egauge devices remain in a cluster with other devices in the begin-
ning. When the number of clusters are 14, the same three Egauge devices (00:00:b8,
00:04:04, Mosberge 0a:28) fell into a cluster (not exclusively) while the other Egauge
device (00:27:cc) went into another cluster (not exclusively). This trend continues and
when the number of clusters are 26, the other Egauge device goes into an exclusive
cluster. The three Egauge devices continue to remain in a cluster (not exclusively)
and then break apart increasingly into different clusters starting from when the num-
ber of clusters are 39. Hence both the Nest Thermostats and the Egauge devices,
though they have a signature on the Wireless interface, it is not as strong as their sig-
nature on the Wired Interface. On the Wired interface, they formed exclusive clusters
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(Egauges not completely) and stuck to it through a large number of iterations. The
same behaviour is not exhibited on the Wireless Interface. Hence, it can be inferred
that both the Nest Thermostats and the Egauge devices are more active over the
Wired interface and hence, their signatures are stronger on Wired.
Washing Machine and Dryer initially remain in a cluster along with the Egauge
devices. When the number of clusters are 10, they move into another cluster with
some other non-IoT devices. When the number of clusters are 19, they move into
a cluster of their own. When the number of clusters are 24, they move into two
exclusive clusters. On the Wireless interface, they moved into an exclusive cluster
sooner than they did on the Wired Interface. That is probably because, their traffic
is higher on the Wired medium; the number of protocols they use over the Wired
medium is 5 whereas the number of protocols they use on the Wireless medium is
just 3. Hence the overall complexity of the data on the Wireless for these devices is
lesser than the complexity of the data observed on the Wired Interface. Hence, they
converge much quickly over the Wireless.
Samsung TV is initially present with other devices. Then it moves into a cluster
with Tp-Link when number of clusters are 8 and remains there. Then it moves into
an exclusive cluster when the number of clusters are 14. The router and Raspberry Pi
move into an exclusive cluster much early, when the number of 6. Hence this proves
again that these devices are very unique in the network.
7.6 External Wireless
For the external wireless clustering, we first take into our experiment all the
devices that are observable at this point, irrespective of the network they belong to.
We take a total of 292 devices, from all the networks that are within range. External
clustering holds so much importance from our thesis point of view because, all these
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data are available to just anyone who can passively observe the network traffic from
outside, without even joining the network.
The Nest thermostats are present in a cluster with other non-IoT devices initially.
When the number of clusters are 20, all the Nest thermostats move into an exclusive
cluster. And they remain that way until the number of clusters are 57. When the
clusters are 58, they break into two exclusive clusters consisting of 3 Nest thermostats
each. They remain that way for some 5 iterations and after that they break into more
exclusive clusters. By the time the clusters are 71, each of the Nest thermostats are
in a unique cluster of their own, though there are still clusters that have 70+ devices
in them. Hence this goes to show that, even from the data that is leaked outside the
network, we can see that the Nest thermostats have a strong signature.
Egauge devices did not have a discernible signature on the external wireless data,
at least when performing the clustering with all the devices that are observable at
this point. Up until the last iteration where the number of clusters are 131, all the
Egauge devices remained in a cluster with some 70+ devices.
Washing machine and Dryer initially remained in a cluster with some 20+ devices.
Then they gradually broke into a cluster with 5+ and fewer devices. When the clusters
were 37, they both moved into an exclusive cluster. And until the last iteration, the
Washing machine and Dryer remain in this exclusive cluster. This goes to show that,
externally, the Washing machine and Dryer have stronger signatures when compared
to the Egauge devices.
The router, from the beginning till the end, remains in a cluster with some 70+
devices. Hence, the router does not have a discernible signature at the external
wireless data, at least when performing clustering with all the external devices. But
the Access Point that we have observed throughout our external data analysis, Apple
(ea:b3:5e) has a very strong signature. It goes into an exclusive cluster much early,
when the clusters are 6. And it remains in this exclusive cluster till the last iteration.
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Hence, we can conclude that while we managed to capture most of the data from the
AP at this external point, we did not capture as much data from the router.
Samsung TV initially remains in a cluster with other devices. When the clusters
are 20, it moves into a cluster with Roku and when the clusters are 36, it moves
into an exclusive cluster of its own. It remains in this exclusive cluster till the last
iteration. Hence Samsung TV also has a strong signature in the external data.
As a next step, we would take exactly the devices that are present in the Internal
wireless medium and take their external data. Therefore, we would be performing
clustering on the external data of the devices present only in the host network; and
compare it to the results obtained from the external wireless clustering done previ-
ously to see if we get the same results.
Nest Thermostats had similar results. Initially they were in a cluster with other
devices. When the clusters were 19, all the Nest thermostats went into an exclusive
cluster. This trend continued and when the clusters were 31, they broke into two
exclusive clusters with 3 Nest thermostats each (the same devices in each cluster),
just like it happened in the external wireless clustering. They remain that way for
some iterations and then increasingly break into more exclusive clusters.
Egauge devices, just like the previous External clustering, did not have a dis-
cernible signature. Up until the last iteration, they were present in a cluster with
15+ other devices. Figure 7.7 on page 116 shows how Egauge stays till the end, in a
cluster where only 20% to 50% of the devices are Egauge.
Washing machine and Dryer were initially in a cluster with 10 other devices and
gradually they broke into a cluster with fewer devices. When clusters were 26, they
both went into an exclusive cluster of their own and until the last iteration they
remain in this exclusive cluster. Hence, the washing machine and dryer also exhibit
the same behaviour as they did in the previous external clustering.
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Figure 7.7: Clustering Progression of Egauges - External Wireless medium
The router, just like before, from the beginning till the end, remains in a cluster
with other 15+ devices. But the Access Point, that is seen throughout the external
data analysis, goes into its own exclusive cluster in the first iteration itself, when the
clusters are 5 and remains that way till the last iteration.
Thus externally, irrespective of whether the clustering is done including all the
devices observable at that point (292 devices) or considering only devices present
at the host network (69), the behaviour exhibited by the devices remains largely
unchanged. Their signatures and how quickly they converge does not change in either
case. Hence, just by looking at the data available externally, without even joining the
network, it is possible to group IoT devices together via clustering.
7.7 External vs. Internal clustering
Up until this point, we were analysing the clustering results of each section of
data. Now we would compare the results of External and Internal clustering to find
out their differences. For this comparison, we would take devices belonging to the
host network alone.
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Nest thermostats form exclusive clusters when the number of clusters are 19 in
External Wireless and remain in this exclusive cluster until the number of clusters
are 30. But in Internal Wireless, the Nest thermostats begin to break into different
clusters (exclusively or non-exclusively) before becoming an exclusive cluster them-
selves. This seems like Nests have a stronger signature on the External wireless. But,
we are considering a lot of parameters like protocols, ports etc., internally, that are
more characteristic of the devices and considering only a few parameters externally.
Therefore the data is more complex in the Internal wireless. Hence the internal goes
a step further and distinguishes among the Nest devices.
Egauge devices have no discernible signature in the external wireless. In the
internal wireless, their signature is better. They increasingly move into exclusive
clusters as the iterations proceed. While for the Nest the external data was sufficient
to produce a signature and the internal was more complex to distinguish even among
the Nest devices, for the Egauges, the external data was not sufficient to produce a
signature and the complex internal data was able to provide them strong signatures.
Washing machine and Dryer have strong signature both in the External and Inter-
nal wireless data. While both remained in an exclusive cluster till the end in external,
they went into two exclusive clusters in Internal. This again proves that there was
enough data to differentiate among the two internally.
Router had a very strong signal internally. It moved into an exclusive cluster when
the number of clusters were 6 and remained so till the end. Externally, it did not have
a discernible signature. It remained in a cluster with other 15+ devices till the end.
This is probably because not all data from the router was captured externally due to
insufficient range. The AP (ea:b3:5e) on the other hand, has very strong signature
both internally and externally. It moved into exclusive cluster very early in both the
clustering. As enough data from it was captured, it exhibited the same behaviour
internally and externally. Samsung TV also had strong signatures both internally and
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externally. It went into an exclusive cluster of its own in both clustering. In internal
clustering, this happened earlier than external clustering, by 5 iterations.
By using the formula that we described earlier, we came with a quantitative
value for the network signature and were able to compare the external and internal
network signature strengths of various devices. Table 7.1 on page 118 shows the
network signatures of various devices calculated both internally and externally. By
comparing them, we can find out whether a device’s internal signature is stronger
than its external signature or vice versa.
Table 7.1: Network Signature of Devices
Device External Internal
Exclusive
Single /
Multiple
Signature
Strength
Exclusive
Single /
Multiple
Signature
Strength
Nest Thermostats 16 Single 0.516 8 Single 0.163
Washer and
Dryer
12 Single 0.387 33 Single 0.674
Samsung TV 16 Single 0.516 14 Single 0.286
Raspberry Pi Never - 6 Single 0.122
Nintendo 8 Single 0.258 33, 38 Multiple 1.449
Apple Laptops 18, 9, 31 Multiple 1.871 15 Single 0.306
Egauge Never - 22, 30, 31 Multiple 1.694
Therefore, when we compare the internal and external clustering, we can see that
many devices go into exclusive clusters early in the internal clustering compared
to the external clustering. Because internal has very rich data that differentiates
between the different types of devices easily. For some devices, they did not have
discernible external signature but devices like Nest thermostats, Washing machine,
Dryer, Samsung TV etc., have enough external data to give them strong signatures
externally itself. Internally, since there is much more information like protocol and
ports, which very strongly reflect the type of activity done by each device, internal
clustering goes one step further and differentiates among the different devices of same
type (Eg: Nest Thermostats) or if there is just one device, it goes into an exclusive
cluster of its own much early.
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7.8 Conclusion
Thus, we have taken the data that is available both internally and externally and
fed them into clustering algorithm. We analysed the results and came up with a way
of calculating the network signature of various devices to qualitatively visualize the
signature strength of various devices. By comparing this signature, we were able to
say that in many cases, the network signature of a device was stronger on the internal
data when compared to the external data. But we also found that the external data
had enough information to give a discernible network signature for many devices albeit
weaker than the internal. From this external signature, we were able to identify many
devices like Nest or the Washing machine proving that the external data that is leaked
outside holds information that is good enough to identify devices.
Also. by using the sum of squared differences between centroids, we were able to
identify top parameters that influenced the clusters to separate in a particular manner,
at every step of clustering. Those parameters that influenced a device towards a
particular cluster or direction would be the parameters that are characteristic of the
device and constitute the profile of the device and helps in identifying the devices from
the network data. By using this information, we can also profile a smart home. From
our data, we found that the internally collected data holds rich information to profile
a smart home by identifying the various types of devices present. But externally
collected data does not hold such a rich information to aid in a clear profiling of our
data collection site.
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CHAPTER 8
FUTURE WORK
As a first step in understanding IoT devices, we collected real-time data for a
maximum period of 6 months from both outside and inside the network. We analysed
the collected data and identified parameters on both sides that differentiated IoT and
non-IoT devices. This showed us, in general, how IoT devices behaved differently in
the network when compared to non-IoT devices. From the data, especially internally
collected data, we were able to identify device specific markers for a lot of devices.
Then we performed clustering on both the internal and external data to group similar
devices and learn their network signature. We also came up with a way of quantifying
the network signature of the devices to qualitatively visualize their signature strength.
Then we investigated the difference in the signature strength between the internal and
external data of the various types of devices and established that, though the internal
signature was stronger than the external signature for many devices, the external
data holds enough information to discern network signatures for at least some of the
devices. We also made an effort at profiling the smart home with this data and found
that, at our site, the internal data enabled a clear profiling of the site revealing the
various types of devices present. But the external data was not good enough for this
task.
As a next step, this experiment could be carried out in another two or three real-
time locations and the results of the analysis from all locations can be compared to
see if particular type of devices behave the same way on all networks. This would
enable in creating a more generalized profile for each type of device that can be
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applied to the network data from any network to identify those devices. Our way
of calculating the network signature strength can be expanded with the help of data
that is collected from all the real-time locations and the formula can be standardized
to be used for any device from any network, stepping it up from its current usage for
qualitative measurement. The internal data has not been completely analyzed for our
experiment. The rich internal data can be analyzed more deeply to reveal even more
device specific characteristics of various devices. This could also help in enriching the
profile of the devices. All the above would help in understanding IoT devices better
and would help in defining more robust and tailor-made security solutions for network
connected IoT devices.
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